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Governance of ICT Standardization: Due Process in
Technocratic Decision-Making
Olia Kanevskaiat
ABSTRACT: In the world of continuous globalization, technical
standards and industry norms play a crucial role in transnational
economic development. For the past few decades, increased
digitalization and emergence of new technologies gave due
prominence to ICT standards: our future is closely linked to the
Internet of Things and 5G technologies that are expected to
penetrate an enormous range of economic sectors and therefore
affect our quotidian life. At the same time, the introduction of
these new technologies is accompanied by concerns such as
privacy and security. In particular, security has been subjected to
a wider political debate recently, largely fueled by national
security concerns voiced by Western governments regarding the
involvement of China-based companies in the standardization of
5G technologies. In this context, this paper discusses whether the
current regulatory landscape can address the variety of concerns
raised in relation to the development of ICT standards through
well-established procedural principles for standard-setting, such
as openness, transparency, and consensus, and whether these
principles ensure that ICT standardization remains balanced and
inclusive, while delivering cutting-edge technological solutions.
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Industry regulation through voluntary standards has sparked the
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interest of lawyers and political scientists for quite some time. In
general, standards reign in domains characterized by scientific
complexity and weak State regulation. In the Information and
Communications Technologies ("ICT") sector, traditionally driven
by high-tech companies and business associations, standards
prescribe methods applied in electronic devices and enable
connections between networks, interfaces, and products of different
vendors.' Examples include the standardization of Internet and web
protocols, the development of wireless connectivity standards, and
the deployment of cellular mobile networks. In spite of their
intrinsic voluntary nature, ICT standards serve as blueprints for
manufacturers to achieve compatibility with other products, and
lead to economies of scale and generate network effects.2
Notwithstanding their commercial and practical advantages,
ICT standards may sometimes result in economic or administrative
burdens by pushing up compliance costs for companies.3 To
illustrate, measures related to the prevention of cyber-attacks or
espionage, such as mandatory security certification of network
elements,# or rules prohibiting US federal agencies from purchasing
telecommunications equipment and services supplied by Chinese
manufacturers,' are gradually entering into the wider arena of
international trade. More recently, a number of Western
governments raised serious security concerns regarding the
participation of Huawei, China-based manufacturer of consumer
electronics, in the development of the 5 Generation standards for
I Mark A. Lemley,Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1889, 1898 (2002); Raymund Werle, Standards in the
International Telecommunications Regime 8 (Hamburg Inst. of Int'l Econ., Working Paper
No. 157, 2001); NIL BRUNSSON & BENGT JACOBSSON, A WORLD OF STANDARDs 4-5
(2000).
2 Patrick D.Curran, Standard-Setting Organizations: Patents, Price Fixing, and Per
Se Legality, 70 U. Cm. L. REv. 983, 987 (2003).
3 See Robert W. Staiger &Alan 0. Sykes,International Trade, National Treatment,
and Domestic Regulation, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 149,152 (2011).
4 Comm. on Tech. Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: Minutes ofthe Meeting
of 9-10 March 2016, 5 2.2.3.3, WTO Doc. G/TBT/M/68 (May 12, 2016) (discussing
India's deviation from the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangements for testing
procedures).
5 Defending U.S. Government Communications Act, HR. 4747, 115th Cong.
(2018); Federal Acquisition Regulation: Prohibition on Contracting for Certain
Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment, 84 Fed. Reg. 40,216
(Aug. 13, 2019) (to be codified at 48 CF.R. pts. 1, 3, 12, 13, 39, & 52).
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cellular mobile communications ("5G"). These concerns are
aggravated by the fact that 5G networks will form a cornerstone of
the Internet of Things ("oT")-a digitalized system of
interconnected hardware devices, networks and objects, expected to
restructure and replace current economic and social synergy-
placing ICT standardization at the forefront of Western political
agendas.'
Discussions on national security concerns around Huawei's
involvement in loT standardization fit into the wider debate on
whether and how the development of ICT standards takes into
account the growing variety of interests affected by emerging
technologies.' In a broader sense, it prompts the question whether
the current regulatory landscape is sufficient to address concerns of
legitimacy, accountability, and validity arising from the increased
regulatory and practical importance of industry governance, a
question that is especially intriguing from a legal standpoint.
Against this backdrop, this paper aims to explore the prospects
of addressing the balance of interests in ICT standardization through
the applicable procedural principles. Building upon the relevant
scholarship in the field of transnational private regulation, Section
II preliminarily restates the role of industry associations and their
voluntary standards in transnational rule-making, then Section III
discusses the challenges currently encountered in ICT
6 See, e.g., Kiran Stacey & Yuan Yang, Huawei to Sue US. Government Over
Equipment Ban, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/cl4e07d6-3e8e-
11e9-9bee-efab61506f44 [https://perma.cc/Q73N-MPKV] (describing Huawei's lawsuit
against the US government ban on the purchase of equipment from Huawei); America and
its Allies Disagree on Huawei, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/business/2019/0221/america-and-its-allies-disagree-on-
huawei [https://perma.cc/XZJ4-8E7R] (describing the different approaches taken by
Western governments to security concerns about Huawei).
7 See DIRECTORATE-GEN. OF THE EUR. CoMM., European Digital Single Market
Strategy, Digital Economy & Society in the EU: A Browse Through Our Online World in
Figures (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/ict/bloc-4.html
[https://perma.cc/HQ2G-8CLG]; see also The FCC's 5G FAST Plan, FED. COMM.
COMM'N, https://www.fcc.gov/5G [https://perma.ccl8CEZ-CXKV] (The Federal
Communications Commission's strategy to "Facilitate America's Superiority in 5G
Technology.").
8 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NISTIR 8074, INTERAGENCY REPORT ON STRATEGIC
U.S. GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION TO ACHIEVE U.S.
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standardization. The main part of this paper, Section IV, analyzes
procedural safeguards that apply to standard-setting, and that are
derived from the three major regulatory frameworks for standards
development offered by the World Trade Organization ("WTO"),
the United States ("US") and the European Union ("EU").
Ultimately, Section V evaluates whether the current procedural
safeguards for industry standardization are indeed relevant in the
context of ICT standardization and are capable of addressing the
challenges of modem standard-setting faced by the industry,
governments, and civil society.
II. Transnational Dimension of Industry Standardization
ICT standards are growing in their regulatory importance, and
concerns associated with them are not limited to industry players,
but also relate to public interest and civil society. Before addressing
these concerns, however, one needs to understand the different
types of standards and organizations developing those standards,
and how private standards teer the behavior of market actors and
affect a broad spectrum of stakeholders. This section addresses
standard-setting by industry organizations in the context of
transnational private regulation and focuses on institutional aspects
of standardization and the normative power of private standards.
A. Regulation by Industry and Private Actors
The idea ofrule-making as a myriad of global and transnational
regulatory schemes operating in the shadow of traditional legislative
arrangements has for a long time appealed to legal scholars.9 Rules,
practices and processes laid down by sector-specific communities
and that produce strong distributional effects between private
stakeholders are commonly referred to as transnational private
regulation.10  While relying on general consent, participatory
commitment and mutual monitoring, transnational private
regulation is marked by the reallocation of the regulatory power
from domestic governments o private actors operating at the global
9 See, e.g., Colin Scott et al., The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of
Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J. L. & Soc'y 1, 1 (2011); see also Kenneth W.
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L.ORG.
421,421 (2000).
10 Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J. L.
& Soc'y 20,20-21 (2011) [hereinafter Cafaggi].
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level." In this regard, it contrasts starkly with the traditional
Westphalian system of law, where the role of private actors was
significantly limited,12 but also diverges from other forms of private
rules, including custom."
The design and enforcement of transnational regulatory norms
takes place in voluntary organizations or industry associations,
commonly not subjected to governmental control.14  Arising
concerns about democratic deficit, illegitimacy, and
unaccountability of transnational private regulation are addressed
by peer-monitoring mechanisms or market-driven and reputational
measures. 5 Once moved into global regulatory arena, transnational
private regulation can arguably be "legitimized" through the
establishment of institutional and procedural settings.16 To that end,
similar to global rule-making, it often relies on procedural principles
rooted in national administrative laws, such as due process,
transparency, participation, and review."
The enormous benefit of transnational private regulation is its
ability to solve collective action failures and to find compromises
between conflicting interests."   Since transnational regulation
offers more advantages than an uncoordinated action by all actors,
it is also prone to escaping governmental influence and is guided by
technocratic decision-making.19  Over the past decades,
transnational private regimes grew in importance due to the
11 Id.at21.
12 Cf. Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15,20-23 (2005) [hereinafter Kingsbury] (describing five types of
globalized administration).
13 Cafaggi, supra note 10, at 22.
14 Kingsbury, supra note 12, at 16.
15 Cafaggi, supra note 10, at 47.
16 See generally Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, Between Law and Social
Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance, 22 RATIo JURIS 260 (2009) (describing a
framework for understanding global governance through "legalisation" [sic] and
"constitutionalisation").
17 Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Questfor Principles and Values,
17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 187, 201 (2006).
18 Cafaggi, supra note 10, at 48-49.
19 Cf. Martin Shapiro, Deliberative, Independent Technocracy v. Democratic
Politics: Will the Globe Echo the EU?, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 349 (2005)
(comparing transnational regimes to cartels, where members join and stay because the
existence of a joint initiative offers more advantages, despite a constant temptation to seek
self-interest).
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emergence of new policy areas and advancement of industry
domains that have typically been under the hegemony of private
actors, or where States fall short on knowledge and expertise.2 0
Examples range from the diamond industry and private prisons to
professional societies and Internet-routine.21 Implementation of
such normative schemes still depends on a large number of factors,
including the balance of power in a particular sector and the
willingness of stakeholders to reach compromises.22
Against this backdrop, standardization is considered a form of
transnational private regulation, since specifications created by
industry-driven Standard-Setting Organizations ("SSOs") are often
transformed into norms that serve public purposes.23 Accordingly,
technical standards adopted by SSOs should ideally strike a balance
between profit maximization of standardization drivers and
pursuing public interests of technical compatibility.2 4 At the same
time, standards may both support he provision of public goods and
diminish welfare through suppression of efficient variation and
regulatory competition, depending on the particular type of product
and the preferences of individuals and states.2 5
Traditionally, standards are developed by private or semi-public
bodies with a formalized structure and consensus-based ecision
making by their membership. Such SSOs are typically well-
established in standardization ecosystem and even widely referred
to in applicable legal frameworks: examples include International
20 Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global
Regulation, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 663, 671 (2005) [hereinafter Cassese].
21 See generally Panagiotis Delimatsis, The Future of Transnational Self-Regulation
Enforcement and Compliance in Professional Services, 40 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L.
REv. 1 (2017); Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an
Application to Prisons, 112 Q. J. EcON. 1127 (1997); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the
Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD.115(1992).
22 Cf.Tim Bertley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of
Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J.
Soc.297, 300 (2007) (discussing forest certification and labor standards).
23 See Fabrizio Cafaggi & Agnieszka Janczuk, Private Regulation and Legal
Integration: The European Example, 12 Bus. & POL. 1, 3 (2010).
24 Cf. Joseph A. Cannataci & Jeanne P.M. Bonnici, Can Self-Regulation Satisfy the
Transnational Requisite of Successful Internet Regulation?, 17 INT'L REv. L. COMPUTERS
&TECH. 51,57-58 (2003).
25 Cf. Joel P. Trachtman, Toward Open Recognition? Standardization and Regional
Integration Under Article XXIV of GATT, 6 J. INT'L EcON. L. 459, 492 (2003).
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Organization for Standardization ("ISO"), International
Telecommunications Union ("ITU") and European
Telecommunications Standards Institute ("ETSI").26 Standards can
also be developed in industry consortia27 - technical groups
comprised of companies sharing a particular interest in a narrow
scientific field (e.g. Bluetooth Special Interest Group ("SIG") and
World Wide Web Consortium ("W3C")).2 8 Having emerged as a
response to bureaucratic and stagnant standard-setting,2 9 consortia
offer faster processes and are preferred standardization platforms in
the realm of ICT technologies."
The choice of a standards development platform largely depends
on stakeholders' ambition for standardization projects. Companies
wishing to rapidly promote their technology typically opt for
informal committees,." while those pursuing bigger network
26 Note that while States participate in ISO and IEC through designated bodies, ITU
and ETSI generally have a hybrid model that supports contribution from national bodies
as well as private corporations (although the governance structure of the two organizations
is very different).
27 See generally Aija E. Leiponen, Competing Through Cooperation: The
Organization of Standard Setting in Wireless Telecommunications, 54 MGMT. SCI. 1904
(2008); Justus A. Baron & Tim Pohlmann, Who Cooperates in Standards Consortia:
Rivals or Complementors?, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 905 (2013).
28 Similar to formal SSO, consortia may have different institutional settings: some
groups differentiate between promotors (decision-makers) and adopters (implementers).
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), for instance, is a loosely self-organized SSO
with no formal membership. See Biddle et al., The Expanding Role and Importance of
Standards in the Information and Communications Technology Industry, 52 JURIMERICS
J. 177, 183-90 (2012) (discussing the different types of consortia) [hereinafter Biddle].
29 See generally Tim Pohlmann, The Evolution of ICT Standards Consortia, 93
COMM. & STRATEGIES 17 (2014) [hereinafter Pohlmann].
30 See generally Henry L. Delcamp & Aija Leiponen, Innovating Standards through
Informal Consortia: The Case of Wireless Telecommunications, 36 INT'L J. INDUSTRIAL
ORG. 36 (2014) [hereinafter Delcamp & Leiponen]; Biddle, supra note 28 (discussing the
increasing role of technical consortia in the field of ICT); Knut Blind & Stephan Gauch,
Trends in ICT Standards in European Standardization Bodies and Standards Consortia,
32 TELECOMM.POL'Y 503 (2008) (discussing the fact that narrowly focused consortia are
more often found in the telecom and e-commerce industry, while manufacturing consortia
usually has a broader focus). The rationale behind consortia's popularity may also be
explained by the fact that smaller and more homogeneous deliberation groups have faster
decision-making, which is an enormous advantage in a highly competitive and innovative
environment of technology standardization. See Magnus B6strom & Kristina Tamm
Hallstrbm, Global Multi-Stakeholder Standard Setters: How Fragile Are They?, 9 J.
GLOBAL ETHICs 93,107 (2013).
31 See generally Delcamp & Leiponen, supra note 30; Pohlmann, supra note 29;
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externalities or seeking a formal endorsement carry out their
projects in larger organizations.32 In similar vein, companies that
attach more weight to the quality of a standard than to the pace of
its development are likely to join SSOs that follow consensus-based
procedures.33 Loosely organized groups with lower institutional
costs may attract less internationally competitive firms aspiring to
develop regional standards, whereas formal organizations provide
fertile ground for the establishment of global standards.3 4 It may
also occur that recognized SSOs, despite the alleged weaknesses of
their processes, yield better results than informal groups; for
instance, the ITU managed to complete standardization of 56K
modems, initially carried out in two competing consortia, due to the
support from all major market players and the successful resolution
of patent issues.5
That said, industry consortia are commonly presumed to fall
short on the level of procedural and substantive guarantees
compared to their formal counterparts.6 Next to limiting
stakeholder participation, 3 standards development in informal
groups often lacks consensus and dispute resolution mechanisms.3 8
Because informal SSOs can only afford limited due process,
standards they create also lack legitimacy.39
Biddle, supra note 28.
32 See generally Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, A Model of Forum Shopping, 96 Am.
EcON.RE. 1091 (2006); NILS BRUNSSON & BENGT JACOBSSON, supra note 1, at 1; Martin
B.H.Weiss & Marvin Sirbu, Technological Choice in Voluntary Standards Committees:
An Empirical Analysis, 1 EcN.INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 111 (1990).
33 Timothy Simcoe, Standard Setting Committees: Consensus Governance for
Shared Technology Platforms, 102 AM. EcON. REV. 305, 333-32 (2012) [hereinafter
Simcoe].
34 See generally Marc T. Austin & Helen V. Milner, Strategies of European
Standardization, 8 J.EUR.PUB.POL'Y 411 (2001).
35 Shane M. Greenstein & Marc Rysman, Coordination Costs and Standard Setting:
Lessons from 56K Modems (Ctr. for the Study of Indus. Org., Working Paper No. 0056,
2004), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/38700/1/505142961.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8SQM-Z5XT].
36 Delcamp & Leiponen, supra note 30, at 38-39.
37 Biddle, supra note 28, at 184 (explaining this by the separation between different
types of members).
38 Id.; see also Benjamin Chiao et al., The Rules of Standard-Setting Organizations:
An Empirical Analysis, 38 RAND J. EcoN. 905,927 (2007).
39 Cf. Magdalena Bexell, Global Governance, Legitimacy and (De-) Legitimation,
11 GLOBALIZATIONs 289, 291 (2014) (discussing the belief that legitimacy rests on open
and transparent procedures that follow the generally accepted principles of "right process"
2020 557
Concerns that informal standards will outpace formal initiatives
in many areas and will penetrate the regulatory environment are not
uncommon in the EU; the European Commission's proposals in
201140 to recognize and reference technical specifications
developed by consortia in its public procurement procedures gained
quite some critique.4 In a pessimistic scenario, the promulgation of
consortia standards may result in a situation where global regulation
is founded on opaque requirements that are tilted toward a single
group of actors and where firms cannot compete on a level playing
field. More realistic, however, is a situation where the procedural
shortcomings of consortia will irreversibly undermine standards'
quality by not being submitted for testing and approval by a broad
scope of actors- processes that can be implemented by consortia
as a means to compensate for the lack of consensus procedures.
B. Normative Relevance of Industry Standards
Although standards developed by transnational SSOs may exert
normative pull, distinction between "laws" and "standards" is
evident even for a layperson: in the Western world, at least ideally,
the law-making process is run by people's representatives, who are
entitled to set binding legal norms on behalf of the citizens of a
nation-State. Voluntary schemes driven by industry and business
actors clearly do not fit this concept: the opposite would undermine
the whole idea of parliamentary representation and result in a
substantial democracy deficit. Hence, standards are in no way
equivalent to legislation; take, for instance, the difference between
the notions of "technical regulation" and "standard" supported by
the European Union and the World Trade Organization,4 2 or the
and take into account the views of stakeholders).
40 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
European Standardization and amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC
and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC,
2007/23/EC, 2009/105/EC and 2009/23/EC, at 2, COM (2011) 315 final (June 1, 2011).
41 Nevertheless, the proposal was indeed implemented into Regulation 1025/2012.
See, e.g., Recognition of Standards Developed by Industry Fora and Consortiafor Use in
Public Procurement Procedures in the EU - The Importance of Keeping the Process
Simple, EUR. COMM. FOR INTEROPERABLE SYSTEMS, http://www.ecis.eulwp-
content/uploads/2012/03/ECIS-statementonthe_recognition offora and consortia_s
pecifications.pdf[https://perma.cc/NM7R-6UDT].
42 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex lA, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter
TBT Agreement]; Regulation 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council
[Vol. XLV558 N.C. J. INT'L L.
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reference to "voluntary consensus standards" used in the US
legislation."
Following the strand of legal scholarship, standards are
"microcosms of social practices, political preferences, economic
calculations, scientific necessity and professional judgment," or
are in a "grey zone of law, morals, economics and politics" 4 5 and
may even exert a practical effect of "hard legal obligations."46
Indeed, between lengthy discussions, bargaining, and the
compromise process, standards development strongly resembles
law-making (although this does not imply that standards are equal
to laws).47 For instance, designers of Internet specifications for
different levels of network architecture are sometimes compared to
law-makers, as they affect the behavior of actors in a way similar to
the legislators; the idea that "code is law" is familiar to scholars of
Internet governance.48 Hence, despite the wide acknowledgement
of their voluntary nature, standards may still impose practical
obligations on business and societal actors.
As such, there are several routes for transnational voluntary
standards to metamorphize into mandatory equirements. First and
foremost, standards acquire binding force when referenced, cited or
incorporated in a State's legislation.4 9 In the EU, harmonized
of Oct. 25,2012, art. 2,2012 OJ. (L316) 12,12 [hereinafter Regulation 1025/2012].
43 See the terminology used by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and
the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, which will be discussed
infra p. 28 and note 146.
44 HARM SCHEPEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: PRODUCT
STANDARDS IN THE REGULATION OF INTEGRATING MARKETS 6 (2005) [hereinafter SCHEPEL,
CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE].
45 ANNE PETERS ET AL., NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETERS 13 (2009).
46 SCHEPEL, CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 44, at 12-13.
47 Kingsbury, supra note 12, at 15.
48 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (Basic
Books 1990).
49 See Tim Biithe, Engineering Uncontestedness? The Origins and Institutional
Development of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 12 BUs. & POL. 1,
3 (2010) [hereinafter Bithe]; see also INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION & INT'L
ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM., ISO/IEC GUIDE 2:2004, STANDARDIZATION AND RELATED
ACTIVITIES - GENERAL VOCABULARY art. 3.6 (8th ed., Nov. 2004) [hereinafter ISO/IEC
Guide 2] (acknowledging the transformation and describing the term "technical
regulation" as "regulation that provides technical requirements, either directly or by




standards are referenced in the Official Journal of the European
Union ("OJEU") 5 and are often incorporated into legal contracts,
although the use of those harmonized standards is voluntary.5 ' The
US standardization system, in turn, endorses adoption of private
model codes by semi-public organizations and "incorporation by
reference" of private standards by federal authorities.5 2 Unlike the
EU system, the application of referenced standards in the US is not
voluntary; rather, the requirement of "voluntary consensus" applies
to the standards development process."
Due to the specifics of the US standardization environment,
further outlined in the remainder of this paper, many US industry
practices rely on rules set by private SSOs. To illustrate: federal
building, construction, and mechanical model codes representing a
mixture of industry standards, semi-public codes, and public law
have been the norm for a long time.5 4 Voluntary consensus
standards developed by industry-driven bodies thus form a
cornerstone of the US industry regulation, despite that federal
agencies do not exactly follow a democratic process when
implementing private standard, and the control of standards'
adoption is entrusted to technical or procurement bodies, and not-
as it may be expected in democratic rule-making-to enforcement
agencies.
Second, private sector standards may be transformed into
binding obligations once they are endorsed ex post in a fast or "fast-
track" process of an SSO whose standards are widely recognized as
50 Case C-613/14, James Elliott Constr. Ltd. v. Irish Asphalt Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:821 (2016); BAREND VAN LEEUWEN, EUROPEAN STANDARDIZATION OF
SERVICES AND ITS IMPACT ON PRIVATE LAW: PARADOXES OF CONVERGENCE 17 (2017)
[hereinafter VAN LEEUWEN] (discussing publication of the reference to harmonized
standards as a "coordination of soft law rules at European level").
51 VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 50, at 17-18.
52 See generally Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-
Government Age, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 131 (2013) [hereinafter Bremer].
53 Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert Wolfe, Private Standards and the WTO: Reclusive
No More, 16 WORLD TRADE REV. 1, 6 (2017) [hereinafter Mavroidis & Wolfe].
54 SCHEPEL, CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 44, at 153. For
further examples of incorporated standards see, e.g., Jonathan L. Rubin, Patents, Antitrust
and Rivalry in Standard-Setting, 38 RUTGERS L. J. 509, 509-11 (2007); and RON
SCHNEIDERMAN, MODERN STANDARDIZATION: CASE STUDIES AT THE CROSSROADS OF
TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 133-34 (2015), who provides the full list of
interoperability standards for mobile application policy recognized by the FDA.
55 SCHEPEL, CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 44, at 266.
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best practices, such as the ISO or IEC. In this case, a technical
document is directly submitted for the (final) approval of a working
group or even the whole membership, side-stepping the initial
stages of standards development.56 The examples are the Linux
standard for operating systems, which was formally adopted by the
ISO/IEC; the Portable Document Format ("PDF") developed by
Adobe and incorporated into an ISO standard; and specifications
drafted by the International Color Consortium that were used as a
basis for the IEC 61966-series of "color management" standards."
Lastly, standards may become compulsory when they ensure the
functioning of the market in the absence of other regulatory
alternatives." The obligatory nature of standards then stems from
industry-mediated processes and reflects the requirements of
specific markets.59 And while the market pressure is not sufficient
to realize convergence in law,60 standards that are widely accepted
by the industry may still considerably influence firms' capacity to
innovate and conduct business overseas." Companies that do not
comply with these standards also risk tarnishing their reputation.6 2
On a global scale, such standards may serve as indirect trade
instruments and are likely to bear similar practical consequences as
mandated standards, being prerequisites for market access and
reshaping the reality of international commerce.63
This type of transformation is particularly witnessed in technical
56 See INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION & INT'L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM.,
ISO/EC DIRECTIVES PART 1, CONSOLIDATED ISO SUPPLEMENT -PROCEDURES SPECIFIC TO
ISO annex F.2 (10th ed., 2019).
57 For further reading, see Bithe, supra note 49, at 14-15.
58 SCHEPEL, CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 44, at 3-6.
59 Buthe, supra note 49, at 2.
60 VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 50, at 20.
61 According to the European Commission, this especially applies to small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are not always involved in standards
development processes and often lack any operational interest in using a particular
standard. See Directorate-Gen. for Internal Mkt., Indus., Entrepreneurship and SMEs,
Independent Review of the European Standardization System: Final Report, Ref. Ares
(2015) 2179280 (May 26,2015).
62 Equally, companies that do comply with certain standards enjoy reputational
benefits. Buithe, supra note 49, at 3.
63 WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2012 (2012); Steven Bernstein &
Erin Hannah, Non-State Global Standard-Setting and the WTO: Legitimacy and the Need
for Regulatory Space, 11 J. INT'L EcON. L. 575, 586 (2008).
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interoperability standards,64 whose market power is cemented in
their network effects as well as the willingness of consumers to use
certain technology.6 Interoperability of technological platforms is
crucial for achieving a critical mass of actors to expand the size of
the market.6 6 Take the example of technical specifications for
Wireless Local Area Networks ("WLAN"), developed by industry
experts in IEEE 802.11 working group6 7 and commonly known as
Wi-Fi; there is no law that obliges a device manufacturer to
implement this standard, yet, selling a smartphone that does not
support Wi-Fi connection is doomed to failure. Similar logic
applies to Bluetooth and USB specifications and standards for
cellular mobile networks, which for a long time have been endorsed
by telecommunications companies and the ICT industry. Even a
single-actor scheme may gain popularity among the industry,' as
long as a group of actors sharing interest or preference for a certain
standard is established. For instance, prior to its acknowledgement
by the ISO, the aforementioned PDF standard developed by Adobe
had already become a defacto requirement on the relevant market.69
In the context of transnational standardization, ICT standards
hold a special place. Because these technical specifications codify
technological components and prescribe common methods applied
in electronic devices,70 these design and performance standards
64 In ICT standardization, interoperability refers to technical compatibility of
systems and devices to exchange information.
65 Lucio Fuentelsaz et al., Switching Costs, Network Effects, and Competition in the
European Mobile Telecommunications Industry, 23 INFO. SYs. RES. 93, 93 (2012). But see
Luis Cabral & David Salant, Evolving Technologies and Standards Regulation, 36 INT'L
J. INDUS. ORG. 48,52 (2014) (suggesting that consumers are more concerned with prices
rather than with network effects).
66 See EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS: MODIFICATIONS OF A
MODEL FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS 245 (1995) (on the example of cellular phone users).
67 Wireless Local Area Networks, IEEE 802.11, http://www.ieee802.org/11/
[perma.cc/QS3W-23KA].
68 Kraig A. Jakobsen, Revisiting Standard-Setting Organizations' Patent Policies, 3
Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.43,59 (2004).
69 Erik Wijkstrom & Devin McDaniels, International Standards and the WTO TBT
Agreement: Improving Governance for Regulatory Alignment 17 (World Trade Org. Staff
Working Paper ERSD-2013-06, Apr. 25, 2013),
https://www.wto.org/english/res-e/reser_e/ersd201306_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8Q5-
QRHD] [hereinafter Wijkstrom & McDaniels].
70 See Raghu Garud & Arun Kumaraswamy, Changing Competitive Dynamics in
Network Industries: An Exploration of Sun Microsystem' Open Systems Strategies, 14
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 351, 353 (1993); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and
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embody technical solutions to enable interoperability and necessary
interference among various elements of technological systems. ICT
standards provide compatibility between complex electronic
mechanisms, coordinate radio frequencies and encryption software,
and support data transmission across the Internet,   creating
invisible interconnections between hardware pieces, networks, and
interfaces. Next to the above-mentioned specifications for short
range wireless communication technology and cellular networks,
examples of the prominent ICT standards include Transmission
Control Protocols ("TCP") for sending data packets over the
Internet, and Hypertext Markup Language ("HTML") protocol for
designing web pages and web applications.7 2
Against this general background, the next section will shed
some light onto the modem landscape of ICT standardization by
discussing a number of the recent challenges faced by the industry,
SSOs, and civil society actors involved in the development and
implementation of interoperability and Internet standards.
HI.Trends and Challenges of ICT Standardization
Due to its diversity, standardization involves a great variety of
actors who pursue different interests; thus, discussions in SSOs are
often prone to disagreements between stakeholders, and, as such,
standards give rise to a great variety of issues. In the context of ICT
standardization, these challenges often concern intellectual
property, but may also relate to standards availability and balance
of technical and societal interests. This section highlights a number
of topics that have recently come to the forefront of private
standardization.
A. Intellectual Property
Matters related to intellectual property are intrinsic to ICT
standardization. Due to their technical complexity, ICT standards
Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1889, 1898 (2002).
71 See generally Michael L. Tushman & Lori Rosenkopf, On the Organizational
Determinants of Technological Change: Towards a Sociology of Technological Evolution,
14 RES.IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 311 (1992); Tim Weitzel et al., A Unified Economic
Model of Standard Diffusion: The Impact of Standardization Cost, Network Effects, and
Network Topology, 30 MGMT. INFO. Sys. Q. 489,491-92 (2006); Paul A. David & Shane
Greenstein, The Economics of Compatibility Standards: An Introduction to Recent
Research, 1 EcON. INNOV. NEW TECH. 3, 3-5 (1990).
72 These two standards are the cornerstone of every routine Internet use.
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often rely on proprietary solutions to enable their functioning and
implementation. Moreover, with the practice of referencing private
standards in governmental regulation becoming increasingly
common on both sides of the Atlantic, the issue of access to
copyrighted standards that effectively impose legal obligations has
come to the forefront of recent discussions on standardization.7
And while the debate on copyright of standards that exert normative
power goes beyond the ICT sector, it becomes highly relevant in the
context of legitimacy and transparency of SSOs' governance.
Intellectual property concerns related to standards in essence
present a challenge to achieve the balance of different, often
conflicting, interests-either those of standards' users (access to
regulatory documents) and SSOs (exclusive right to reproduce one's
intellectual property), or those of product manufacturers (building
on standardized technology) and patent holders (monetizing their
patents). This balance, however, is crucial for standards' global
acceptance, which in turn enables their network effects and
improves their functionality.74  This section thus introduces the
widely discussed issues related to intellectual property embedded in
standards.
1. Patents Essential for Standards' Functioning
Standards for technical interoperability run on various
proprietary technologies, and the number of these technologies
increases as standards evolve." Accordingly, in order for their
products to interact within the global connectivity networks, device
manufacturers have to use patented technologies embedded into
such interoperability standards, meaning that they should obtain a
license from patent holders against a royalty payment- else, the
property rights of the patent holders would be infringed. Access to
standards and interoperability is thus conditional upon access to
these technologies.
73 To illustrate, see Am. Soc'y for Testing v. PublicResource.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d437
(D.C. Cir. 2018).
74 It is the functionality and global acceptance of ICT standards that also ensure their
output legitimacy. See Raymund Werle & Eric J. Iversen, Promoting Legitimacy in
Technical Standardization, 2 SCI., TECH. & INNOVATION STUD. 20, 39 (2006).
75 IPLYTICS PLATFORM, WHO Is LEADING THE 5G PATENT RACE? A PATENT
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SSOs prefer to take a neutral position in the discussions
surrounding the licensing of patents essential for the functioning of
the standard (known as standard essential patents ("SEPs")):
royalties' negotiations between the licensor and licensee typically
take place outside standard-setting platforms. Nevertheless, each
SSO maintains a Patent Policy requiring its members to commit to
disclose and/or license their essential patents.7 6 The disclosure
obligation requires participants of standard-setting to reveal their
existing patents and patents applications that might become
essential to the standard in development process.7 7 The licensing
obligation requires patent holders to license their SEPs either on
(fair), reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (F/RAND),7 or on
a royalty-free basis, the latter being a common practice in Internet
and software SSOs. 7 9
Patent Policies generally aim to strike the balance between the
interests of patent holders and patent users. They alleviate the risks
of SEP owners abusing their technological supremacy by
strategically concealing their essential technology during standard-
setting negotiationss or by setting excessive licensing fees (a
76 See Jorge L. Contreras, An Empirical Study of the Effects of Ex Ante Licensing
Disclosure Policies on the Development of Voluntary Technical Standards, NAT'L INST.
OF STANDARDS & TECH. (June 27, 2011),
https://www.nist.gov/system/files/nistger_11_934_empircalstudyofeffectsexantelicensing
2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DRK-AC4E] [hereinafter Contreras, An Empirical Study]
(discussing SSO's Patent Policies). Often, both disclosure and licensing commitments are
required.
77 Id.
78 While "RAND" is preferred terminology in the US, "FRAND" and "RAND" are
often used interchangeably. Under US doctrine, F/RAND terms are akin to a contractual
commitment. See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledge Enforcement Theories, in PATENT
PLEDGES: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT LAW'S PRIVATE ORDERING FRONTIER 101
(Jorge L. Contreras & Meredith Jacob eds., 2017) (on FRAND commitments under US
law); Timothy S. Simcoe & Allan L. Shampine, Economics of Patents and
Standardization: Network Effects, Hold-up, Hold-out, Stacking, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND
PATENTS 100, 111 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018) (on SSOs' licensing policies as
"incomplete contracts"). The meaning of FRAND is not widely agreed through the
industry and may be interpreted differently in different jurisdictions.
79 See Thimo P. Stoll,Are You Still in? The Impact ofLicensing Requirements on the
Composition of Standards Setting Organizations (Max Planck Inst. for Innovation &
Competition Research Paper No. 14-18, Dec. 15, 2014)
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=2535735 [https://penna.cc/6LVD-
VVP3].
80 See In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117, *7 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006),
2020 565
566 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLV
situation referred to as "patent hold-up")" while, at the same time,
protecting innovators against free-riding on their creations and
ideally, ensuring their appropriate reward.8 2 The existence of Patent
Policies, however, does not always prevent the disputes arising in
the context of patent licensing terms.
Most patent-related issues revolve less around specific patents,
but rather their application. Unregulated licensing practices may
result in abusive behavior by technology-owners and fuel
uncertainties among implementers; in turn, low royalty-rates may
disincentivize innovative contributions from firms that have heavily
invested in their R&D. Antitrust investigations of the past two
decades, conducted by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") (i.e.
Dell;8 3 Rambus8 4) and the European Commission (Samsung;"
Motorola;` Qualcomm87) revolved around the abusive or deceptive
licensing practices by holders of SEPs. In this regard, the ambiguity
of FRAND terms and lack of transparency in SEP disclosure have
been explicitly addressed by regulators on both sides of the
Atlantic.8
rev'd 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing allegations that Rambus deceived
members of JEDEC about its efforts to patent and develop technologies, in violation of
JEDEC's operating rules and procedures).
81 Luis Cabral& David Salant, Evolving Technologies and Standards Regulation, 36
INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 48, 49 (2014) [hereinafter Cabral & Salant]; Joseph Farrell et al.,
Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTTRUST L.REv. 603, 608 (2007); Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L.REv. 1991,1992
(2007).
82 Cabral & Salant, supra note 81, at 51.
83 In re Dell Comput. Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996).
84 In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006), rev'd,
522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
85 European Commission Press Release IP/12/1448, Antitrust: Commission Sends
Statement of Objections to Samsung on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-
Essential Patents (Dec. 21,2012).
86 European Commission Press Release IP/13/406, Antitrust: Commission Sends
Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone
Standard-Essential Patents (May 6,2013).
87 European Commission Press Release MEMO/09/516, Antitrust: Commission
Closes Formal Proceedings Against Qualcomm (Nov. 24, 2009).
88 See Renata Hesse, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Remarks as Prepared for the ITU-T Patent Roundtable: Six "Small" Proposals for SSOs
Before Lunch 6 (Oct. 10, 2012), https://wwwjustice.gov/atr/file/518951/download
[https://perma.cc/4H92-472C] (addressing hold-up); Makan Delrahim, Ass't Att'y Gen.,
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at the USC Gould
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Concerns around SEP licensing are expected to grow with the
deployment of 5G not only due to the increasing number of patents,
but also as a result of arising cross-border and cross-sectoral
licensing issues. The integrated infrastructure of the loT, expansion
of patents to sectors other than ICT (i.e. agriculture) and increased
cooperation among SSOs will contribute to uncertainties around
access to standards and should be addressed in the interests of
society.9
2. Copyright of Standards that Exert Normative
Obligations
As explained in Section II, referencing private standards or
codes in law is not uncommon among regulators. Ideally, when
metamorphizing into legal requirements, standards should be
accessible to those bound by their mandatory force; the reality,
however, is that the majority of private standards is protected by the
copyright held by the creators of those standards - the SSOs.90
Reproduction or distribution of a standards document is thus
effectively prevented by their private ownership: this implies that
placing private standards referenced in law into public domain
(where the law belongs) risks violating SSOs copyright over these
standards.
While earlier US case law was inconclusive with regard to the
copyright of referenced standards,91 the Fifth Circuit Court of
School of Law: Take it to the Limit: Respecting Innovation Incentives in the Application
of Antitrust Law 11 (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download [https://perma.cc/P2GN-
YV66] (on preventing collusive behavior of competitors); see also Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, and the European Economic
and Social Committee, Setting out the EU Approach to Standard Essential Patents, § 2.1,
COM (2017) 712 final (Nov. 29, 2017) (suggesting calculations of royalty-rates).
89 See AXEL WALZ ET AL., IDPRMUNICHIP DISP. RESOL. F., FRAND ADRCASE
MANAGEMENT GUIDELINEs 7 (May 2018), http://www.ipdr-forum.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/frand-guidelines-helveticarz6_klein o line.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SB2L-N7V6]; CHRYSSOULA PENTHEROUDAKIS & Jusus A. BARON,
LICENSINGTERMS OF STANDARD ESSENTIALPATENTS: ACOMPREHENSIVEANALYSIS OF
CASES 10 (Nikolaus Thumm ed., 2017).
90 But cf. Emily S. Bremer, On the Costs ofPrivate Standards in Public Law,63 KAN.
L.REv.279, 282 (2015) (standards developers voluntarily provided free online access to a
surprisingly large share of Pipeline Hazardous Material Safety Administration's
standards); Bremer, supra note 52.
91 In BOCA and CCC, the Courts concluded that the copyright of standards is lost
once they are referenced in a legal act, see Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Tech.,
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Appeals confirmed in Veeck9 2 that once put into public domain, the
code in question was transformed into law and hence fell outside
the purview of copyright provisions.93 The practice of copyright of
standards incorporated by reference is however still present in the
current US standardization system: in the recent case ASTM v.
PRO,9 4 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals was cautious with drawing
any further conclusions regarding public access to copyrighted
standards, merely stating that standards incorporated by reference
into law are "at the outer edge of 'copyright's protective
purposes."'95
In the EU, the German Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) found that in the discussion on
copyrighted standards, the public interest in free access prevailed
over copyright protection.96 In turn, the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands (Hoge Raad) held that when a standard is not published
following the procedure specified in applicable Dutch law, it is not
legally binding and hence, eligible for copyright claims.97
The EU Court of Justice ("CJEU") has not yet been presented
with the opportunity to elaborate on the matters related to the
copyright of harmonized standards supporting the EU legislation
Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 735 (1st Cir. 1980); CCC Info. Sers. Inc. v. MacLean Hunter Mkt.
Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1994), while in Practice Management, he right to
claim copyright was granted since the standards were easily available to public. Practice
Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by
133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998).
92 Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc),
cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003).
93 Id. at 796.
94 Am. Soc'y for Testing & Materials v. PublicResource.Org, Inc, No. 1:13-cv-
01215 (TSC), 2017 WL 473822, (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2017), amended by 896 F.3d 437 (D.C.
Cir. 2018).
95 Am. Soc'y for Testing& Materials v. PublicResource.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d 437,451
(D.C. Cir. 2018). Id. at 24. Interestingly, PRO criticized current standardization systems,
alleging that by lobbying to have their standards adopted into law and then limiting access
to the standards document with copyright, SSOs ignore the right to access the text of the
law.
96 BVerfG July 29, 1998, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIF [NJW] T 1 (para. 17),
1998 (Ger.) (discussing that standards issued by the Deutsches Institutfiir Normung (DIN)
lose their copyright protection when referenced in a legislative act).
97 HR 22 juni 2012, NJ 2012, 397 (T 3.10) m.nt. (Knooble BV/State) (Neth.); see
also Rob Van Gestel & Hans-W. Micklitz, European Integration Through
Standardization: How Judicial Review is Breaking Down the Club House of Private
Standardization Bodies, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 145 (2013).
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and policy. In the past decade, however, the CJEU has
demonstrated a consistent trend towards submitting voluntary
standards to fundamental principles of EU law, effectively pulling
private standards into domain of law.9 8 In Fra.bo, the Court found
that a private body could defacto regulate market access "in the
light of inter alia the legislative and regulatory context in which it
operates."99 In James Elliott, it ruled that, given the publication of
a reference in the Official Journal of the EU ("OJEU"), harmonized
standards were measures implementing or applying an act of EU
law, and hence should be viewed as part of it.' Whether and how
the CJEU will address private ownership and sale of incorporated
standards in the context of constitutionalizing of industry regulation
heightens the sense of curiosity in the European standardization
system.'0
While the decisions of US courts lack legal certainty,o2 the
deafening silence of the EU institutions on copyright of harmonized
standards, together with the balkanized approach across
standardization and copyrights laws of the EU Member States, add
to the ambiguities about the access to standards documents. Yet, a
global approach to standards' copyright is necessary in the light of
the growing tendency of globalized, multi-stakeholder standard-
setting, where national industries rely on each other's' standards"'
98 See generally Paul Verbruggen & Barend Van Leeuwen, The Liability ofNotified
Bodies Under the EU's New Approach: The Implications of the PIP Breast Implants Case
(C-219115) 10 (Tilburg Private Law Working Paper Series No. 08/2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3038830 [https://perma.cc/DLA5-
PPD3.
99 Case C-171/11,Fra.bo SpA v. Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches
eV (DVGW) - Technisch-Wissenschaftlicher Verein, ECLI:EU:C:2012:453 (July 12,
2012)526.
100 Case C-613/14, James Elliott Constr. Ltd. v. Irish Asphalt Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:821 (Oct. 27, 2016) TJ 32-40.
101 See also EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR ELECTROTECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, CEN
AND CENELEC POSITION ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE EUROPEAN




102 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright,
Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REv. 291, 296-97 (2005)
(discussing that they lack legal clarity because the US Courts are trying to strike a balance
between dual policy objectives).
103 See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National
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and where efforts are channeled into creating universal standards-
with 5G being the most prominent example of cooperation between
a broad range of industries, regulators and SSOs. The issue of
access in fact lies deeper than the copyright of standards or codes
referenced in legal acts: since even those standards that are not
incorporated in regulation can exert compliance pull,104 should they
not be freely accessible to stakeholders subjected to the normative
obligations imposed by such standards, even if these stakeholders
do not pursue technical or commercial interests?
B. Non-Technological Interests in ICT Standardization
The described conflict between property rights and access to
standards and technologies essential for their implementation is but
one of many cases illustrating how fragile the balance in standard-
setting can be. Standardization affects a wide range of interest
groups, including governments, commercial actors, and civil
society; this specifically applies to ICT standardization, whose
direct impact on quotidian life is often eclipsed by multi-
dimensional and technologically complex narrative. Concerns
voiced by non-technical actors of ICT standardization are not
uncommon, especially since the "roll-out" of many loT standards is
rapidly approaching.
The most vivid example is the allegation that participation of
China-based companies in standardization of 5G network
equipment poses a national security threat to Western
governments.105 This statement, arguably, should not be viewed as
a distrust towards Chinese firms, but rather as a distrust in the
Chinese regulatory system under which these firms operate.106
Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U.PA.L.REV.469 (2000) (discussing that courts
should create global norms in terms of copyright laws so that there is a global standard).
For instance, many standards of the American Petroleum Institute (API) are used by the
European oil and & gas industry.
104 See SCHEPEL, CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 44, at 6.
105 Kiran Stacey & Yuan Yang, Huawei to Sue US Government Over Equipment Ban,
FIN. TnEs (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/cl4e07d6-3e8e-11e9-9bee-
efab61506f44 [https://perma.cc/MAT6-65ZE]; America and its Allies Disagree on
Huawei, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/business/2019/02/21/america-and-its-allies-disagree-on-
huawei[https://perma.cc/767Z-AUQZ].
106 Jan-Pieter Kleinhans, 5G vs. National Security: A European Perspective 2
(Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, Feb. 2019), www.stiftung-
nv.de/sites/default/files/5gys._nationalsecurity.pdf [https://perma.cc/3K7F-GU8M].
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Since 5G infrastructure is expected to become critical for the future
economy, concerns around its deployment go beyond the somewhat
more "traditional" matters of quality and performance of mobile
networks and enter the political arena. At the same time, given the
limited number of manufacturers of 5G equipment,' one may not
help but place this debate in the context of growing technology
competition between different economies.
Other non-technological concerns arise with regard to alleged
increased exposure to radio frequency radiation as a consequence of
5G deployment.'0 Although sporadically addressed by applicable
regulatory tools,' 0 9 the potential danger of 5G networks to the
environment and public health has not been discussed as such by
SSOs involved in 5G standardization." 0 The question thus remains
whether the current framework of ICT standardization allows actors
other than industry or governmental stakeholders to protect their
interests and voice their concerns in technocratic decision-making
processes.
Indeed, many SSOs that operate in complex technical domains
The report also notes that due to the lack of technical tools to guarantee trustworthiness of
5G equipment, device manufacturers have the ultimate burden to prove that their products
are secure, while acting under regulatory restrictions of the country in which they are
established.
107 Id. at 4.
108 See International Appeal: Stop 5G on Earth and in Space, INT'L APPEAL: STOP 5G
ON EARTH & IN SPACE,https://www.5gspaceappeal.org/the-appeal [https://perma.ccl528H-
WVFX]; Letter from Sen. Richard Blumenthal and Representative Anna G. Eshoo to
Brendan Carr, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm. (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://www.jrseco.com/wp-content/uploads/2018-1203-Sen-Blumenthal-Rep-Eshoo-to-
FCC.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CTC-MR3A]. In this regard, see also Revision of the HF
Guidelines, INT'L COMM'N ON NON-IONIZING RADIATION PROTECTION (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://wwwicnirp.org/en/activities/news/news-article/revision-of-hf-guidelines-
2017.html [https://perma.cc/T8WA-EJQG]; The Impact of RF-EMF Exposure Limits
Stricter Than the ICNIRP or IEEE Guidelines on 4G and 5G Mobile Network Deployment,
INT'L TELECOMM. UNION (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-K.Supl4-
201909-l/en [https://perma.cc/QDM9-HUAD].
109 However, it should be noted that the concerns were met skeptically by the
European Commission, which delegated the responsibility to the Member States. Nicola
Caputo, European Parliamentary Questions E-003975/2018, 5G Radiation and Health
Risks (July 17,2018).
110 See Dominique Maria Bonessi, The Promise of 5G Comes With a Regulatory
Headache and Health Risk Concerns, WAMU (Dec. 6, 2019),
https://wamu.org/story/19/12/06/the-promise-of-5g-comes-with-a-regulatory-headache-
and-health-risk-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/H8PJ-UCK8]. To the author's knowledge,
there were no technical committees formed in SSOs to address this issue.
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include societal interests in their mission statements,"' and some
even allow general public to comment on the final draft of their
standards, albeit against a fee (i.e. IEEE)112 or set a very low
threshold for joining technical work through their mailing list (i.e.
IETF). But even when standards procedures invite contributions
from societal actors, the latter may still lack the necessary
procedural tools to partake in standard-setting activities of the given
organizations. Moreover, decision-making in SSOs' governance
bodies often allows only limited participation or, as it is the case in
industry consortia, does not include all SSO membership. Yet, such
governance rules, including membership requirements, voting
quorum and patent policies, effectively underpin the functioning of
SSOs and their standard-setting procedures, ensuring that all
relevant interests are taken into account."3
C. The Need to Address the Imbalance in Standardization
While the abovementioned challenges were discussed in the
context of ICT standardization, they can be traced in other types of
industry-driven standard-setting'1 4 and should be viewed in the
context of larger dynamics of increased private rule-making. In this
regulatory setting, standardization activities that ignore the wide
range of interests and are driven by technocratic reasoning are likely
to give rise to a number of fundamental concerns, including the
legitimacy and validity of standards. These concerns cannot be
ignored, especially in the view of the globalized networked society
Ill See, e.g., Our Values - Vision & Mission, INT'L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM'N,
http://www.iec.ch/about/values/vision.htm [https://perma.cc/9ZZN-LQ2E] (last visited
Jan. 24, 2020); About IEEE, INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG'RS,
https://www.ieee.org/aboutlindex.html [https://perma.cclK3KX-27ZC] (last visited Jan.
24, 2020); W3C Mission, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM,
https://www.w3.org/Consortium/mission#vision [https://perma.cclN3CE-RW6E] (last
visited Jan. 24, 2020).
112 INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG'RS, IEEE-SA BOARD OPERATIONS MANUAL § 5.4.5
(2019) [hereinafter IEEE-SA, OPERATIONS MANUAL].
113 SSOs policy-making has been recently discussed in the context of balanced
representation of SSO membership. JUSTUS A. BARON ET AL., MAKING THE RULES: THE
GOVERNANCE OF STANDARD DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR POLICIES ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 84 (Nikolaus Thumm ed., 2019) [hereinafter BARON ET
AL., MAKING THE RULES].
114 For example, standards for good agricultural practices. Khalid Nadvi, Global
Standards, Global Governance and the Organization of Global Value Chains, 8 J.ECON.
GEOGRAPHY 323, 330 (2008).
N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLV572
GOVERNANCE OF ICT STANDARDIZATION
of the future, where different sectors, technologies and services will
be intertwined and the issue of balance of interests will grow even
stronger. The problem presented in this part of the paper is as much
technical, societal, and political as it is legal, since representation of
various interests is ensured through procedural safeguards provided
for by the regulatory frameworks in which technical SSOs operate.
In view of this, the next section observes how non-technical
concerns can be accommodated in SSOs' decision-making under
the current legal framework governing industry standardization.
IV.Regulating SSOs via Procedural Legal Frameworks
Despite the fact that most standards are developed in a self-
regulatory environment, private-sector standardization has not been
completely overlooked in most international and national legal
systems. While the complexity of standards' contents is entrusted
to technical experts in SSOs' working groups, regulatory
frameworks attempt to curb standardization activity by introducing
several procedural principles to which SSOs have to adhere to in
order to benefit from a certain treatment."' Standards developed
according to these principles do not unduly restrict international
trade or raise antitrust concerns and can be referenced in national
laws. Drawing upon the applicable legislation, case law, and
scholarship, this section explores how private standardization is
regulated under the WTO rules, on which most procedural
frameworks for standards development are built and which are
implemented by numerous SSOs. It then compares the WTO
standardization principles with the corresponding requirements in
US and EU law by offering an overview of regulatory tools
available for performing procedural scrutiny of SSOs' processes.
A. Standards Under Different Regulatory Frameworks
1. The World Trade Organization (WTO)
The WTO system attaches cardinal importance to regulatory
consistency in Members' trade policies. The requirements of
eliminating disproportional protectionist regulations, avoiding
arbitrary discrimination, and treating "like cases alike" are widely
115 These principles are encapsulated in the frameworks of WTO, US, and EU
regulatory frameworks, and will be discussed in section IV.B.
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employed in WTO Agreements and case law.'16 While the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") holds a broad
expectation that parties to the Agreement will cooperate for the
purpose of harmonizing international rules affecting production,
transportation, and marketing,"' it is the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade ("TBT") that contains provisions governing
standardization activities." 8 Essentially, the TBT agreement aims
to balance Members' right to adopt measures pursuing legitimate
objectives of TBT Article 2.2 with the WTO's objective to promote
liberalization of international trade."' To that end, it provides
Members with certain flexibility to develop restrictive policies
while acting in accordance with the Agreement,'120 and ensures that
such policy space is not abused by Members seeking to protect their
own markets.
Next to the general Most-Favored Nation Treatment and
National Treatment obligations,121 the TBT Agreement encapsulates
elements of negative integration, requiring Members not to design
technical regulations that aim to frustrate trade and are more trade-
restrictive than necessary for fulfilling legitimate policy
objectives,122 and not to maintain restrictions in case the objective
of circumstances have changed.123  The crucial provision of the
Agreement is Article 2.4, which calls upon Members to use existing
relevant international standards (voluntary) as a basis for their
technical regulations (mandatory),2 4 meaning that there should be
116 Id.
117 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXXVIII(2)(c), Oct. 30, 1947, 61.
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
'18 TBT Agreement, supra note 42; Appellate Body Report, European Communities
- Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, ? 80, WTO Doc.
WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Mar. 12, 2001) (discussing that obligations imposed by the
TBT Agreement are supplementary to those arising from the GATT).
119 Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Production and
Sale of Clove Cigarettes, T 96, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 4,2012).
120 Wijkstrom & McDaniels, supra note 69, at 4.
121 TBT Agreement, supra note 42, art. 2.1.
122 Id.art.2.2. For the definition of necessity under article 2.2, see Appellate Body
Report, US - Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, ?r 374-79,
WTO Doc. WT/DS384/ARB, WT/DS386/ARB (adopted June 29, 2012).
123 TBT Agreement, supra note 42, art. 2.3.
124 Except when those are ineffective to achieve the legitimate objective. According
to Howse, this requirement should be understood in terms of reasonableness, meaning that
there must be a reasonable relationship between the international standard and the
[Vol. XLV574 N.C. J. INT'L L.
GOVERNANCE OF ICT STANDARDIZATION
a "very strong and substantial relationship between a regulation and
the substance of the international standard."25  The distinction
between a "technical regulation" and a "standard" is explained in
Annex 1,126 which also specifies that an international standard
within the meaning of the TBT Agreement should be approved by
an international body or system offering its membership to all WTO
members.127 Domestic measures based on such relevant
international standards enjoy a rebutted presumption of not
impeding international trade.28
The TBT Agreement does not provide definition of a "relevant
international standard." The Appellate Body held in US-Tuna II
standards are "relevant" when they are crafted in SSOs with
"recognized standardization activities"12 9 and found that even when
not based on consensus (as required in Annex 1.2), international
standards still fall under the scope of TBT Article 2.4,130 as long as
domestic regulation, although the notion of reasonable relationship was rejected by the
Appellate Body in Appellate Body Report. Compare Robert Howse, A New Device for
Creating International Legal Normativity: The WTO Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement and "International Standards," in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTLEVEL TRADE
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL EcNMIC LAW 383, 385-86 (Christian Joerges &
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2011) (stating that the requirement should be understood in
terms of reasonableness, meaning that there must be a reasonable relationship between the
international standard and the domestic regulation), with Appellate Body Report,
European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines, T 247-48, WTO Doc.
WT/DS231/AB/R (adopted Sept. 26, 2002) [hereinafter EC-Sardines] (rejecting the
notion of reasonableness).
125 EC-Sardines, supra note 124, T 245 (showing that the burden of proof in this case
lies on complainant(s)).
126 TBT Agreement, supra note 42, annex 1.1 & 1.2.
127 Id.
128 Id. art. 2.5 (showing that the wording is also different from art. 2.4).
129 Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ? 376, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R
(adopted June 13, 2012) [hereinafter US-Tuna II]; Annex I of the TBT does not clarify
when a body is "recognized." Arguably, recognition is evidenced by acknowledgement of
standards in National Standards Organizations (see explanation in Section IV.A.3), id.,
para. 361. Cf. Mislay Mataija, Leveraging Trade Lawfor Governance Reform: The Impact
of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade on Private Standard-Setting, 2 EUR.
REV.PRIv. L. 293, 301 (2019); Panagiotis Delimatsis, "Relevant International Standards"
and "Recognized Standardization Bodies" Under the TBT Agreement, in THE LAW,
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION 104, 123 (Panagiotis
Delimatsis ed., 2015).
130 US-TunaII, supra note 129,? 353. See also TBT Agreement, supra note 42, annex
1.2; EC-Sardines, supra note 124, ?? 219-33 & 255 (showing that the appellate body
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the usual procedure of the body that has adopted the standard
follows the consensus-requirement."' Likewise, the Appellate
Body confirmed that whether or not a measure can be classified as
a "relevant international standard" to a great extent depends on its
drafting process,132 and referred to the TBT Committee Decision
and its six principles3 3 as a tool for interpretation and application of
the TBT Agreement to international standards.1 3 4
Next to the Committee Decision, the Code of Good Practice of
the TBT Agreement provides procedural framework for standards
development1 3 which applies to (non)-governmental bodies within
the territory of WTO Members." Requirements introduced by the
Code of Good Practice to be followed by SSOs somewhat mirror
TBT provisions addressing WTO Members.13 7
It is up to WTO Members to ensure that their central
standardization bodies accept the Code of Good Practice and
already extended the scope of the TBT Agreement beyond standards crafted in ISO and
IEC, but nevertheless referred to the ISO/IEC Guide 2 for the definition of a standard).
131 Such reasoning of the Appellate Body is unsettling because it opens avenues for
those organizations whose standards are not widely used to be considered as relevant
standards bodies, aggravating concerns of legitimacy of international standards regimes.
See Robert Howse, A New Devicefor Creating International Legal Normativity: The WTO
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and "International Standards," in
CONSTYrUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC
LAW 383, 389 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2011).
132 This was first stated in EC-Sardines, supra note 124.
133 Comm. on Tech. Barriers to Trade, Second Triennial Review of the Operation and
Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 4: Decision on
Principlesfor the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations
with Relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement, WTO Doc. G/TBT/9
(Nov. 13, 2000) [hereinafter TBT Committee Decision]. The principles implemented in
other legislation, e.g. Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 42, rec. 2, will be analyzed in the
following sections.
134 As pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(a), May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. For further commentary on the decision, see Panagiotis
Delimatsis, Global Standard-Setting 2.0: How the WTO Spotlights ISO and Impacts the
Transnational Standard-Setting Process, 28 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 273, 284 (2018)
[hereinafter Delimatsis, Global Standard-Setting].
135 TBT Agreement, supra note 42, annex 3.
136 Id. In contrast to the TBT Committee Decision that applies to international
standards bodies.
137 TBT Agreement, supra note 42, annex 3(D), (E) & (F) (referring to such principles
as MFN and national treatment, as well as requiring that standards do not result in barriers
for international trade and are based on international standards).
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comply with its provisions,"' even when SSOs have not accepted
the Code-which is a prerequisite for SSOs to act in conformity
with TBT.' 9 With regard to regional, local, and non-governmental
standardizing bodies within their territories, Members are required
to take reasonable measures to ensure acceptance and compliance
of these bodies with the provisions of the Code of Good Practice.14 0
Yet, it remains unclear what "reasonable measures" should be taken
by Members to ensure that their local and non-governmental bodies
fulfill the requirements of Article 4.1 and Annex 3 of the TBT
Agreement,14 1 and what consequences will be faced by Members
who do not comply with this obligation.1 4 2
2. The United States (US)
The standardization framework of the US is largely based on
decentralization and public-private partnership, where standards
development activities are delegated to industry-driven bodies.
Circular A-119, enacted by the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB") in 1982,14 ("OMB Circular"), encouraged the private
sector to develop voluntary standards, and instructed federal
governments to incorporate the reference to private standards into
138 Id. art. 4.1 & annex 3(B).
139 Id.art.4.2.
140 Id. art. 4.1 & annex 3(B).
141 See Vera Thorstensen et al., Private Standards - Implications for Trade,
Development and Governance, E15 INITIATIVE (Sept. 2015),
https://el5initiative.org/publications/private-standards-implications-for-trade-
development-and-governance/ [https://perma.cc/XF72-5BFV]. Some commentators have
argued that taking "reasonable measures to ensure compliance" is an empty obligation, or
at least an obligation of a process. See Eva van der Zee, Disciplining Private Standards
Under the SPS and TBTAgreement: A Pleafor Market-State Procedural Guidelines, 52 J.
WORLD TRADE 393 (2018).
142 Cf. Enrico Partiti, What Use Is an Unloaded Gun? The Substantive Discipline of
the WTO TBT Code of Good Practice and its Application to Private Standards Pursuing
Public Objectives, 20 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 829,834 (2017); Comm. on Tech. Barriers to Trade,
Notification Under Paragraph C of the WTO TBT Code of Good Practice, WTO Doc.
G/TBT/CS/N/199 (Feb. 20, 2019) (showing that until December 2018, no Member has
notified the acceptance of the Code of Good Practice by a non-governmental body within
its territory: the first private body accepting the Code is the U.S.-based Calendaring and
Scheduling Consortium "CalConnect").
143 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR
No. A-119, FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF VOLUNTARY
CONSENSUs STANDARDS ANDIN CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ACTIITIES (1982).
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legislative documents.'" Since the original OMB Circular provided
little guidance as to how the standards should be implemented,14 5 it
was practically ignored until 1995, when the National Institute of
Standards and Technology ("NIST") of the Department of
Commerce gained control over standardization and conformity
assessment policy and mandated agencies to use voluntary
consensus standards developed by private organizations in lieu of
governmental standards to achieve their policy objectives.14 6
While implementing the provisions of the National Technology
Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 ("NTTAA") and the related
executive orders of the US Government,14 7 the updated OMB
Circular clarified the role of federal agencies in US standardization
activities, addressing the issue of national implementation of private
voluntary schemes.14 8 Additional guidance was offered by the
revision in 2016 and addressed, among other things, agencies'
participation in private standards development activities as well as
factors that should be considered by agencies when referencing a
standard in regulation,49 such as effectiveness and suitability of that
standard for agency's needs, the extent to which it falls under the
definition of voluntary consensus standard and whether it is
"reasonably available."'5o This last factor generated a wide-ranging
discussion during the revision of the OMB Circular, which
prompted a number of questions concerning standards' accessibility
in a non-regulatory context, availability for "the class of persons
144 Id.
145 SCHEPEL, CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 44, at 87-88, n.49.
146 National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
113, §§ 2(1), 11, 110 Stat.775, 775-80 (1996).
147 Proposed Revision to Circular No. A119, "Federal Participation in the
Development and Use of Voluntary Standards; Invitation for Public Comment," 47 Fed.
Reg. 16,919 (proposed Apr. 13, 1982) (Apr. 20, 1982).
148 OMB Circular A-119; Federal Participation in the Development and Use of
Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, 63 Fed. Reg.
8546, 8549 (Feb. 19,1998).
149 OFFICE OFMGMT. &BUDGET, ExEc.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINAL REVISION OF
OMB CIRCULAR A-119 (Jan. 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/Al19/revised_circ
ular a-119_as-of.1_22.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8ME-6JE3] [hereinafter REVISED OMB
CIRCULAR A-119]; Revision of OMB Circular No. A-119, "Federal Participation in the
Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment
Activities," 81 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan.27, 2016).
150 Id. at 4673.
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affected" and the necessity of a "freely available, non-technical
summary."
As such, the definition of "reasonable availability" falls outside
the purview of the OMB Circular and is a matter of the Office of the
Federal Register ("OFR").1 52 Nevertheless, the OMB clarified
certain factors that can assist agencies (but should not necessarily
be followed by agencies) in determining whether a standard is
indeed reasonably available to interested parties. These factors
include accessibility of a read-only version of a standard during the
comment period; costs associated with the access to a standard and
incorporated materials; the degree to which such access is required
to achieve agency's policy goals; and availability of a summary
explaining the content of a standard to those lacking relevant
technical expertise.'   Remarkably, the issue of standards'
copyright did not play a significant role in deliberations on
standards' availability.
Industry-driven SSOs may be subjected to accreditation by the
American National Standards Institute ("ANSI"),the "administrator
and coordinator" of the US standardization system15 4 empowered to
develop rules for other US-based SSOs.1" Unlike the NTTAA and
OMB Circular, which address the US agencies that reference private
consensus standards, ANSI's Essential Requirements target
standard development processes and constitute "the minimum
acceptable due process requirements for the development of
consensus.""' Only those SSOs whose procedures are in line with
this set of principles may be accredited as American Standards
151 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1) (1996) (this is a
"reasonably available" requirement of the Freedom of Information Act), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996).
152 Id. (the statutory obligation of OFR on reasonable availability is balanced with US
copyright law, US international trade obligations, and agencies' ability to substantively
regulate under their authorizing statutes). See Incorporation by Reference, 79 Fed. Reg.
66,267 (Nov. 7, 2014).
153 REVISED OMB CIRCULAR A-119, supra note 149, at 20-21, T 5(f).
154 Emily S. Bremer, American and European Perspectives on Private Standards in
Public Law, 91 TUL.L.REv 325, 341 (2016) [hereinafter Bremer, American and European
Perspectives].
155 AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS (Jan. 2020) [hereinafter ANSI
ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS] (note that ANSI neither develops tandards itself nor mandates
them).
156 Id. § §1.0, 2.0.
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Developers ("ASDs").1 5 7 Furthermore, ANSI applies a similar set
of requirements to the accredited standards developed in private
SSOs as American National Standards ("ANSs"). While the US
legal framework does not require either accreditations for standards
to be used for regulatory and policy purposes, the ASD and ANS
designation grant a sort of presumption of compliance with the
OMB Circular and confer legitimacy to particular standards and
recognition to SSOs.5 9
The US federal agencies have often acknowledged potential
antitrust risks stemming from coordinated standards
development.1 6 0 Collaborations in SSOs may give rise to collusive
behavior when companies involved in technical committees attempt
to tilt standards development processes in their favor by excluding
competitors,161 breaching Section 1 of the Sherman Act.162 While
research and development activities have traditionally benefited
from the "rule of reason" treatment under National Cooperative
Research and Production Act of 1993 ("NCRPA"),1 6 3 the Standards
157 AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., Constitution and By-Laws,
https://share.ansi.org/shared%20documents/About%20ANSI/Governance/ANSIConstit
ution.andByLaws_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/N73Q-QX7H] (2015) (as of January
2018, ANSI accredited 237 SSOs, which together have produced more than 11,500
American National Standards); see AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., Introduction to ANSI,
https://www.ansi.org/aboutansi/introduction/introduction?menuid=1
[https://perma.cc/3PT7-3ZRC].
158 AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., Introduction to ANSI,
https://www.ansi.org/aboutansi/introduction/introduction?menuid=1
[https://perma.cc/3PT7-3ZRC].
159 Cf. Bremer, American and European Perspectives, upra note 154, at 147-48.
160 See Renata Hesse, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Remarks at the Chatham House Conference on Globalization of Competition Policy: Can
There Be a "One-World Approach" to Competition Law? (June 23, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-renata-b-
hesse-delivers-remarks-chatham-house [https://perma.cc/PHN5-KGH7] (regarding the
near unanimity around the world about the importance of discovering and prosecuting
cartels).
161 Cf. BJORN LUNDQVIST, STANDARDIZATION UNDER EU COMPETITION RULES AND
US ANTITRUST LAWS: THE RISE AND LIMITS OF SELF-REGULATION (2014) [hereinafter
LUNDQVIST].
162 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
163 The NCRPA was adopted in 1993 and amended the National Cooperative
Research Act of 1984 ("NCRA"), which addressed joint research cooperation. Lundqvist
suggested the NCRPA disincentivizes private plaintiffs and antitrust enforcement agencies
to bring to the court companies operating in R&D. See LUNDQVIST, supra note 161, at
181.
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Development Organizations Advancement Act of 2004
("SDOAA")1 6 4 extended the protection of US antitrust laws to SSOs
by expanding the scope of the rule of reason to private standards
developmentorganizations.65
In part, SDOAA 2004 may be viewed as an (admittedly,
overdue) reaction to the Supreme Court's ruling in ASME v.
Hydrolevel,1 6 6 which stipulated that an SSO can be held liable for
its agents' misuse of standard-setting processes with an anti-
competitive objective, even if the SSO in question have never
ratified, authorized, or derived any benefit from this activity, as long
as the agents have acted under the "apparent authority" of the
organization.1 6 7 SDOAA 2004 further implements the requirements
of the OMB Circular and, similar to ANSI, introduces a set of
procedural principles SSOs have to comply with to fall within the
scope of this Act and hence, to benefit from the rule of reason
treatment.1 68
In the course of time, several SSOs' were subjected to scrutiny
against antitrust provisions, and in particular Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. In Allied Tube,1 6 9 the Supreme Court stated
that private standard-setting programs should be based on the merits
of objective expert judgment and follow procedures that prevent
standard-setting processes from being biased by members with
economic interests in stifling competition.17 0  On different
occasions, the conduct of an SSO was found not to violate Section
1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, for instance when certain
technology was not selected to be included into the standard due to
the supposed "monopsony" or "conspiracy" by the SSO's
164 The SDOAA amended the text of the NCRPA 1993.
165 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
237, § 102(8), 188 Stat. 661, 662 (2004) (in practice, however, SSOs were using the
NCPRA even before the amendment since the definition of "research" was very wide and
could cover activities of SSOs); LUNDQvIST, supra note 161, at 151.
166 Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
167 Id. at 557-58.
168 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-237, §
102(5), 118 Stat. 661, 662 (2004).
169 Allied Tube v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
170 Id. at 509 (interestingly, the Court also held that "statutory adoption of private
standard does not determine whether that private entity's conduct is immune from the
antitrust laws").
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3. The European Union (EU)
Unlike the US, the EU maintains a centralized standardization
system. From the outset, technical standards were specified in a
patchwork of Directives, whose complexity and ineffectiveness,
together with political challenges to achieve consensus among
Member States, impeded technical harmonization.n Meanwhile,
the European markets remained balkanized by national standards
and regulations, which posed major obstacles for intercommunity
trade and precluded the completion of Internal Market.7 3 With the
introduction of the "New Approach" in 1985,174 the EU
standardization regime became co-regulation between European
and national regulatory institutions and private technical bodies,
where private standards developed by the three European
Standardization Organizations ("ESOs") (CEN, CENELEC and
ETSI) 7 6 are used to support EU legislation and policy goals.177
Standards development, administration, and other related
activities of the ESOs (and, occasionally, NSOs) are co-financed by
171 E.g., Adamaxx Core v. Open Software Found., 152 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 1998); Golden
Bridge Tech. v. Motorola Inc., 547 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2008).
172 SCHEPEL, CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 44, at 63; Jacques
Pelkmans, New Approach to Technical Harmonization and Standardization, 25 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 249,251 (1987).
173 Harm Schepel, The New Approach to the New Approach: The Juridification of
Harmonized Standards in EU Law, 20 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 521, 522-23
(2013) [hereinafter Schepel, New Approach].
174 Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a New Approach to Technical
Harmonization and Standards, 1985 O.J. (C 136) 1.
175 See also Megi Medzmariashvili, Delegation of Rulemaking Power to European
Standards Organizations: Reconsidered, 44 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 353, 355
(2017).
176 Member States can participate in ESOs through their National Standards
Organizations (NSOs). Companies can also join ETSI membership.
177 European Directives merely cover general requirements, such as health, safety and
protection of consumers or environment. For the list of New Approach Directives and
Regulations, see EUR. COMM. FOR ELECTROTECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION (CENELEC),
New Approach Directives,
https://www.cenelec.eu/aboutcenelec/whatwestandfor/supportlegislation/newapproachdir
ectives.html [https://perma.cc/XP23-HA3R]. For the list of harmonized standards, see
EUR. COMM., Harmonised Standards, https://ec.europa.eulgrowth/single-
market/european-standards/harmonised-standardsen[https://perma.cc/B2VQ-UH83].
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the EU.1" Funding becomes especially relevant when it comes to
the issue of accessibility and availability of standards. From the
three ESOs, only ETSI puts its standards in public domain,
presumably since its members are prepared to pay higher
membership dues to compensate for the "loss of income" from
standards' selling."' This financial model would not work for CEN
and CENELEC, where different standardization activities are run
by different types of members.10
Where US federal agencies are merely encouraged to take part
in private standards development, the European Commission is
empowered to request development of European harmonized
standards ("ENs") and to determine content requirements of these
documents.'8 1 For manufacturers, compliance with such mandated
standards grants products a "free movement pass" and allows their
unrestricted circulation in all Member States.1 8 2 References to ENs
are published in the OJEU. 8 3  Except where objections to
harmonized standards can be raised under a different EU act, the
Regulation allows Member States and the European Parliament to
178 Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 42, arts. 15-16.
179 This assumption has been communicated to the author by a number of ESOs staff
members.
180 Unlike ETSI, CEN/CENELEC do not grant membership to private companies.
Hence, ETSI's members are predominantly commercial firms, while CEN/CENELEC
members are mostly NSOs. See EUR. TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST. (ETSI), Current
Members, https://www.etsi.org/membership/16-membership/23-current-members
[https://perma.cc/472H-7LPK] for current ETSI members. See EUR. COMM. FOR
STANDARDIZATION (CEN), CEN Members,
https://standards.cen.eu/dyn/www/f?p-CENWEB:5 [https://perma.cc/D9TB-TLPC], for
current CEN members. For a list of current CENELEC members, see EUR. COMM. FOR
ELECTROTECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION (CENELEC), List of CENELEC National
Committees,
https://www.cenelec.eu/aboutcenelec/whoweare/ceneleccommunity/members/index.html
[https://perma.cc/KFY3-KSU3] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
181 Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 42, art. 10 (note that apart from ENs, the ESOs
also develop other standardization deliverables, such as guides and reports).
182 Cf. Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a New Approach to Technical
Harmonization and Standards, 1985 O.J. (C 136) 1, annex II. See List ofNew Approach
Directives, CE-TEST, https://www.cetest.nl/european-new-approach-directives.htm
[https://perma.cc/A9W5-XVUE], where specific standards are referenced in the New
Approach Directives and Regulations. Indeed, compliance with harmonized standards is
just one way to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of the Directives.
183 Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 42, art. 10(6). Note that under the old approach,
publication was merely informative.
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initiate a formal objections procedure, under which the Commission
may decide, upon consultations with experts, whether to publish or
maintain a harmonized standard.'18 4
Similar to the US, the EU legislation addresses antitrust
concerns related to the work of SSOs, which may potentially breach
Article 101(1) of the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union
("TFEU"). Economic advantages of standardization agreements are
recognized under the guidelines for horizontal cooperation
agreements ("the Guidelines"), adopted in 2001 and updated in
2011.18 The Guidelines provide that standardization agreements
that do not restrict competition by object by having the risk of
creating market power, would normally fall outside the scope of
Article 101(1), as long as they comply with the cumulative
conditions of the "safe harbor:" unrestricted participation in
standard-setting, transparent procedure, no obligation to comply
with a standard and FRAND-based IPR policies. 8 6 The failure to
fulfill these conditions does not directly lead a presumption of
anticompetitive conduct:1 87 an effect-based assessment is required
to establish whether the agreement at issue falls under Article
101(1) of the TFEU, and whether it can be "saved" by Article
l~()188101(3)."
The principles of the safe harbor were tested by the CJEU in
184 Id. art. 11. Recently, Germany raised a formal objection against EN ISO 19085-
3:2017 proposing safety requirements for woodworking machines, who stated that
publication of the standard in the OJEU should be accompanied by a declaration that
compliance with the standard at issue does not result in a presumption of conformity with
the essential health and safety requirements of the EU Machinery Directive (2006/42/EC).
See Directorate-Gen. for Internal Mkt., Indus., Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Formal
Objection Against EN ISO 19085-3:2017 Woodworking Machines - Safety Requirements
- Part 3: Numerically Controlled Boring and Routing Machines Under Article 12 of
Regulation (EU) No. 1025/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 316) 12 (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/27324[https://perma.cc/7XB6-ZSGN].
185 European Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements,
2011 OJ. (C 11) 1 [hereinafter Horizontal Guidelines].
186 Id.5 280.
187 Id. T279.
188 Id. 5 273; see also Damien Geradin, The European Commission Policy the
Licensing of Standard-Essential Patents: Where Do We Stand?, 9 J.COMPETITION & EcON.
1125, 1126 (2013). As it may be reasonably expected, the Guidelines prohibit so-called
"fraud" standardization agreements - the use standards development in a discriminatory
manner or as a tool for exclusion of actual or potential competitors. See LUNDQVIST, supra
note 161, at 199.
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EMC Development,"s where the Court accepted the possibility to
scrutinize CEN's processes against the procedural requirements of
the EU Horizontal Guidelines, intentionally bypassing the analyses
on alleged cartelization.190 Accordingly, it is only the process of
drafting a standardization agreement, not its effects, which were
subject to scrutiny under competition law.191 This case illustrates
that standards crafted within ESOs could be potentially examined
under Article 101(1), despite that the earlier case law found CEN to
be entrusted with general economic interest,1 9 2 and thus immune
from competition claims.
B. Governance Principles and Procedural Safeguards in
Industry Standardization
Each regulatory framework discussed in the previous section
formulates a set of principles to which private SSOs should adhere.
These principles revolve around the quality of SSOs processes (i.e.
transparent process and open membership) as well as the quality of
their outcome (i.e. standards that are relevant for the needs of the
market). To bring some clarity to their application, this section
reviews procedural safeguards introduced by the regulatory
frameworks of the WTO, US, and EU, and makes some preliminary
observations about the relevance of these safeguards for private
standardization.
1. Decoding Procedural Principles for Standards
Development
This sub-section provides a holistic overview of procedural
principles that are derived from the regulatory frameworks of the
WTO, US, and EU, and explains how these principles are
interpreted in each of the frameworks. It furthermore discusses how
these principles were applied in practice by introducing some recent
examples or considerations when SSOs' compliance with these
principles was at stake.
a. Transparency
Perhaps one of the most common principles encountered in
189 Case C-367/10 P, EMC Dev. AB v. Comm'n, 2011 E.CR. 1-00046.
190 Id. TT 94-104.
191 Id. ST 114-21.
192 Case T-4/92, Evangelos Vardakas v. Comm'n, 1993 E.C.R. II-359, T 47.
2020 585
N.C. J. INT'L L.
applicable regulatory frameworks is the principle of transparency.
In a transnational setting, transparency is used as a tool to provide
stakeholders with a grip on accountability and is essential for the
functioning of a multi-stakeholder organization.193 As one of the
main facets of administrative law, transparency is realized by
providing timely access to the relevant information,1 9 4 such as
decisions of an organization and its committees and resources that
underpin them.
In the multilateral trading system, transparency facilitates
harmonization and coherence of technical requirements across the
WTO Members. The general provision on transparency in
standardization activities, namely Article 2.9 TBT Agreement,'96 is
implemented by the TBT Committee Decision, which in turn
specifies steps to be taken by SSOs to achieve greater transparency,
such as publishing of work programs,197 notifying standardization
activities, allowing access to the relevant information at least to the
interested parties and providing opportunities to comment on
standards' drafts.'98 The Code of Good Practice clarifies that a copy
of a draft standard should be provided in a non-discriminatory
manner to any interested party requesting it,199 and that an "adequate
period of time" for submitting comments amounts to at least 60
days.200 When publishing their working programs or (draft)
standards, SSOs should also consider technical means available in
different countries.201
193 See Magnus B6strom & Kristina Tamm Hallstrm, Global Multi-Stakeholder
Standard Setters: How Fragile Are They?, 9 J.GLOBALETmcs 93,100 (2013).
194 Monica Blagescu & Robert Lloyd, Accountability of Transnational Actors: Is
There Scope for Cross-Sector Principles?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS
270, 278 (Anne Peters et al. eds., 2009).
195 Id.; Elizabeth Fisher, Transparency and Administrative Law: A Critical Evolution,
63 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1, 272 (2010).
196 TBT Agreement, supra note 42, art. 2.9.
197 Comm. on Tech. Barriers to Trade, Second Triennial Review of the Operation and
Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Under Article 15.4, T 4,
WTO Doc. G/TBT/37 (Nov. 6,2015).
198 TBT Committee Decision, supra note 133, annex 4,5 B(4).
199 TBT Agreement, supra note 42, annex 3(M), (P).
200 Id. annex 3(L).
201 TBT Committee Decision, supra note 133, annex 4, 5 B(3). The TBT Committee
has taken a number of steps in recent years to facilitate implementation of the principle of
transparency, such as improving notifications and functioning of enquiry points and
exchanging regional experiences. Comm. on Tech. Barriers to Trade, Eighth Triennial
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In the US regulatory framework, transparency applies both to
federal agencies, which should announce their participation in
standardization activities related to the issues of national priority or
(international) regulation,2 02 and to SSOs, which should notify their
work on current and new standards and make written procedures
available to all stakeholders.2 03  In similar vein, there are
requirements to notify all parties affected by the particular
standardization activity and to allow access to information, laid
down in the SDOAA 2004.204 Other elements of transparency are
encapsulated in the ANSI's principle of "openness" and include
providing information on parties' affiliation and notifying
stakeholders of particular development activities.205
In EU law, the Horizontal Guidelines mention that
standardization platforms should implement procedures informing
stakeholders in "good time" of on-going, finalized, and future
standardization work at each stage of standards development.20 6
Similar to the TBT framework, where the role of "notifications hub"
is entrusted to the ISO and the WTO TBT facility, Regulation
1025/2012 provides that notifications of NSOs and informal SSOs,
whose standards may be used by the Commission for procurement
purposes, should be submitted to the ESOs.2 0 7 Yet, where
Regulation 1025/2012 obliges SSOs to make their work programs
publicly available,2 08 the TBT Committee Decision does not speak
in terms of "public availability," but rather, the "easy accessibility"
of information regarding SSOs' current work programs.
In practice, however, transparency is not always present in
SSOs. Industry consortia especially appear to lack transparency,
since most prefer to remain a closed group of technical experts and
to not publish information relevant to their ongoing and future
Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade Under Article 15.4,55 6.1.1, 6.6.2 & 7, WTO Doc. G/TBT/41 (Nov. 19, 2018).
202 REVISED OMB CIRCULAR A-19, supra note 149,5 6(e).
203 ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS, supra note 155, §§ 1.5, 1.9 & 2.5 (referring
directly to notification requirements and not to the notion of transparency).
204 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 (2004), Pub. L.
No. 108-237, § 102,188 Stat. 661 (2004).
205 ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS, supra note 155, § 2.1.
206 Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 185, at 60.
207 Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 42, art. 12.
208 Id. art 3.3.
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standards development. For instance, SSOs such as VXI bus and
the Open Geospatial Consortium, while providing information on
their recent products or sometimes even putting their standards into
public domain, do not publish their work program,2 09 which is
required under the notion of transparency in the WTO. This fact
has also been indicated as preventing effective communication
and-sometimes necessary-information exchange among
standardizationplatforms.210
b. Openness and Participation
Related to transparency is the principle of participation or
openness. Participation is believed to facilitate effective policy
shaping by providing possibilities to consult stakeholders at the
early stage of rule-making and to exchange past experiences.2 11 To
that end, participation should be meaningful and effective; it should
allow actors to change the outcome by approval or acceptance
processes.2 12 In SSOs, broad stakeholder engagement results in
wide-ranging technical discussion and contributes to standards'
adoption by industry.213 Yet, in a narrow-specialized technical field,
increased participation may dissipate the effectiveness of technical
processes and cause breakdowns in experts' negotiations,2 14 or
unnecessarily prolong technical deliberations, which in turn
209 Cf. Standard Program, OPEN GEOSPATIAL CONSORTIUM,
https://www.opengeospatial.org/ogc/programs/spec [https://perma.cc/X3WA-VE4E].
210 According to a conversation between the author and an industry expert. While this
procedural shortcoming may allegedly be compensated by standards endorsements in fast-
track processes of formal SSOs, it does not take away the fact that stakeholders may have
been deprived of opportunities to participate at the earlier stage of standards development.
211 Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Questfor Principles and Values,
17 EuR. J.INT'L L. 187, 202 (2006).
212 Cf. Kate O'Neill et al., Actors, Norms, and Impact: Recent International
Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate, 7 ANN. REV. POL.
Sci. 149, 168 (2004); Andrew Moravczik, Is There a "Democratic Deficit" in World
Politics? A Frameworkfor Analysis, 39 Gv'T & OPPosrrIoN 336,342 (2004) (discussing
the openness in policy decision-making).
213 Cf. Tim Bithe, Engineering Uncontestedness: The Origins and Institutional
Development of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 12 Bus. & POL. 1,
11 (2010) (discussing the increased legitimacy due to participation of global actors).
214 Cf. David Stasavage, Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and
International Bargaining, 58 INT'L ORG. 667, 668 (2004) (discussing the transparency in
international policy-making).
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threatens the effectiveness of a standard.2 1 5
The TBT Committee Decision provides that open and
unrestricted participation should be guaranteed at all levels of
standard-setting, including proposals of new work items, technical
discussions, and voting.2 1 6 However, pursuant to the wording of the
Decision, requirement o ensure that participation is also meaningful
applies only to standards development.
In the earlier version of the OMB Circular, the principle of
openness was explained as "providing meaningful opportunities to
participate at all stages of standards development."2 1 7 During the
revision of the OMB Circular, however, many commenters voiced
concerns that the providing participation "at all stages" may burden
the work of SSOs while, as a practical matter, this requirement was
already implemented by the principle of transparency.2 1 8
Accordingly, the sentence was replaced by "providing meaningful
opportunities to participate on a non-discriminatory basis."2 19 In
turn, SDOAA 2004 stipulates that all procedural principles,
including openness, should be applied also to all SSOs'
standardization activities and "actions relating to the IPR
policies."220
In the EU, the Horizontal Guidelines require SSOs to implement
the principle of participation via objective and non-discriminatory
distribution of voting rights, in particular as regards to the processes
of technology selection.2 21 Regulation 1025/2012 requires ESOs to
ensure participation of all affected stakeholders, particularly those
representing social interests or a particular group,222 public
authorities (also addressed by the OMB Circular)223 and medium-
215 Id.
216 TBT Committee Decision, supra note 133, annex 4, T C(6).
217 REVISED OMB CIRCULAR A-119,supra note 149, at 9.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 (2004), Pub. L.
No. 108-237, §103(1)-(7), 188 Stat. 661 (2004).
221 Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 185, at 59.
222 Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 42, recs. 17 & 24.
223 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR
A-119: FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF VOLUNTARY
CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND IN CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT AcTIVvrTEs 5 6(D) (2016).
2020 589
sized enterprises (SMEs),224 both at the policy development level
and at various stages of standards development (i.e. standardization
proposal, technical deliberations, submission of comments and
revision processes).2 2 5 This does not imply, however, that
stakeholders should be granted voting rights for (all) these
standardization phases.2 26 Where ESOs operate on the basis of
national delegation, the duty to involve all relevant actors lies upon
NSOs.227
None of the frameworks explain what should be understood
under the term "policy development"-even though the TBT
Committee Decision and Regulation 1025/2012 accurately define
standards development stages.228  At the same time, while patent
policies constitute a part of standardization activity in SDOAA,2 2 9 it
is unclear whether those are covered by the TBT Committee
Decision, especially given the fact that the TBT Agreement is silent
on the intellectual property issues related to standards. In the United
States, some clarification was provided by the recent appeal
decision of the ANSI Executive Standards Council (Exact), which
confirmed that the ANSI Essential Requirements, including
openness and consensus, do not apply to the development of
standard-setting policies.230
c. Consensus, Impartiality and Balance
As established by the ISO/IEC Guide 2, a document widely used
as a reference by national and international standardization bodies
224 Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 42, arts. 5-7 & rec. 2.
225 Id. art. 5(1).
226 Id. rec. 23.
227 Id. arts. 6, 7 & rec. 2.
228 TBT Committee Decision, supra note 133, annex 4,5 C(6); Regulation 1025/2012,
supra note 42, art. 5(1).
229 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 (2004), Pub. L.
No. 108-237, § 103(1)-(7), 188 Stat. 661 (2004).
230 E.g., Nicolas Petit, The IEEE-SA Revised Patent Policy and its Definition of
"Reasonable" Rates: A Transatlantic Antitrust Divide?, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 211 (2017) (discussing that the dispute revolved around the updated
IPR policy of IEEE Standards Association, whose contents and drafting process received
a barrage of criticism); Nicolo Zingales & Olia Kanevskaia, The IEEE-SA Patent Policy
Update Under the Lens of EU Competition Law, 12 EUR. COMPETITION J. 195 (2016); J.
Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division's Devaluation of Standard Essential Patents, 104
GEo. L. J.48 (2015).
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and dispute settlements mechanisms,231 a standard is by definition
established by consensus,232 which the Guide defines as a "general
agreement characterized by the absence of sustained opposition to
substantial issues by any important part of the concerned interests
and by a process that involves seeking to take into account the views
of all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting arguments,"
but that "does not imply unanimity."2 3 3
When referring to consensus-based standards, TBT Committee
Decision further develops the requirement of meaningful
opportunities, emphasizing that standards development processes
should not privilege or favor particular interests, and that consensus-
procedures should seek to consider the views of all parties
concerned and reconcile any conflicting arguments.234 In this
context, all standard development processes should guarantee
impartiality with respect to, i.e. access to the relevant information,
participation and submission of comments and decision-making
through consensus.235  The latter invites for an assumption that
within the meaning of TBT Committee Decision, consensus only
serves as a safeguard of equality during the preparation of standards:
where consensus process "should seek to take into account the
views of all parties, impartiality 'should be accorded.'2 3 6
A similar "effort-based" obligation is maintained by ANSI,
which calls SSOs to make "an effort [to resolve] all expressed
objections"23 7  and generally prohibits any exclusion and
discrimination in standards development.238 In particular, ANSI
provides that standards development processes should (strive to)
have a balance between different interest categories,239 which
should be discretely defined by SSOs and cover all materially
affected parties.2 4 0 ANSI also emphasizes the lack of dominance by
231 THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM: A DEVELOPING COUNTRY
PERSPECTIVE 129 (Alberto do Amaral Junior et al.eds., 2019).
232 ISO/IEC Guide 2, supra note 49, art. 3.2.
233 Id. art 1.7.
234 TBT Committee Decision, supra note 133, annex 4,5 D(8).
235 Id., annex 4,5 D(9).
236 Compare id., with id. at 5 D(8).
237 E.g., ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS, supra note 155, at 8.
238 Id. at 4.
239 Id. at 4-5.
240 Id. at 4.
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any single interest category, individual or organization, meaning the
exclusion of other considerations due to the leverage, strength or
representation of a dominant stakeholder (group).2 4 1 In general, no
test for dominance is required, except when the dominance is
claimed in writing by a directly and materially affected party.242 In
turn, the OMB Circular requires SSOs to preserve standards
development processes that are balanced, provide a meaningful
engagement from a broad range of parties and ensure that no single
interest should dominate the decision-making.2 4 3
Regulation 1025/2012 specifies that in the context of ICT
standards, consensus does not imply unanimity, but an achievement
of the general agreement by seeking to take into account the views
of all parties concerned and to reconcile conflicting arguments;
consensus is typically reached when there is an absence of sustained
opposition to substantial issues by affected stakeholders.24
Furthermore, impartiality of ICT standards should be viewed in the
light of technological development: standards should be neutral and
stable and should not impede innovation.24 5
In short, consensus serves as an overarching requirement and
encapsulates a number of other procedural principles rooted in
administrative law. Reasoned and justified decisions serve to
restrain the power of stronger parties,2 46  while balancing
stakeholders' engagement in decision-making processes, reduces
the chance for a standard to be adopted over the objections of
stakeholders.247
241 Id.
242 Id. at 5.
243 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR
A-119: FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF VOLUNTARY
CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND IN CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES 2(e)(I) (2016)
(showing that the Circular terminology is rather simplified; as opposed to "balance of
interests" or "balance of representation" in the earlier versions of the Circular, the ANSI
Essential Requirements, and the SDOAA 2004).
244 See Regulation 1025/2012, annex II 3(b) 2012 O.J. (L 316) 29 (EU) (discussing
that the definition of consensus is in regard to ICT standards).
245 Id. annex II (4)(c).
246 Eyal Benvenisti, The Interplay Between Actors as a Determinant of the Evolution
of Administrative Law in International Institutions, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 319, 326
(2005).
247 JOANNE YATES & CRAIG N. MURPHY, ENGINEERING RULEs GLOBAL STANDARD
SETTING SINCE 1880 60-62 (2019); ANDREw L. RUSSEL, OPEN STANDARDS AND THE
DIGITAL AGE: HISTORY, IDEOLOGY, AND NETWORKS 56 (Cambridge University Press
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As discussed earlier, the notion of an international standard
under the WTO was somewhat complicated by the Appellate
Body's ruling in US-Tuna II, which effectively stretched the scope
of Article 2.4 TBT Agreement to international standards that are
not based on consensus.2 4 8 Some authors suggested that since TBT
Committee Decision introduces the principles as a "best effort"
requirement, it merely obliges SSOs to establish a consensus-
building process.2 4 9 Moreover, each SSO implements requirement
of consensus differently: for instance, where IEEE-SA establishes a
voting quorum for achieving consensus,2 5 0 IETF merely relies on
"humming" and the decisions the working groups' chairs. 25 1
As in the case of transparency, informal standardization groups
may fall short on impartiality and balance. W3C, which develops
standards and specifications for various web technologies, is
sometimes considered a "benevolent dictatorship" where the
Director has the ultimate decision-making power.2 5 2 A recent
example is the decision to approve Encrypted Media Extensions
("EME") recommendation as a W3C Recommendation (read: W3C
standard) despite a strong opposition and the fact that the approval
vote that marked a strong departure from consensus.253
Whether or not consensus is always beneficial, let alone
feasible, is likely to depend on SSOs' operational field and scope of
activities. For example, development of web standards is strongly
2014).
248 US-Tuna II, supra note 129,5 353. Discussions on whether or not an international
standard should be based on consensus arose even before the US-Tuna II report was
adopted. For instance, the US argued that a standard for transportation packaging of
lithium batteries established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was
not an international standard for the reason that it was adopted by voting, and not
consensus, and hence this document should not have been used as a basis for national
technical regulations. See also Wijkstrom & McDaniels, supra note 69, at 7.
249 Ming Du & Fei Deng, International Standards as Global Public Goods in the
World Trading System, 43 LEGAL ISSUES EcoN.INTEGRATION 113,134-35 (2016).
250 IEEE-SA,OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 112, §§ 5.4.3.3, 5.4.3.5.
251 The Tao oflETF: A Novice's Guide to the Internet Engineering Task Force, IETF,
§4.2 (2019), https://ietf.org/about/participate/tao/ [https://perma.cc/4MJR-Z9Q3].
252 See Jorge L. Contreras, A Tale of Two Layers: Patents, Standardization and the
Internet, 93 DENV. U. L. REv. 853,874-75, n.102 (2016).
253 Press Release, World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), W3C Publishes Encrypted




driven by technical excellence, rather than consensus.25 4 But even
if consensus-building may delay standards development processes,
it is still believed to guarantee better outcomes in the long run.2 55
d. Effectiveness and Relevance
The Appellate Body in EC-Sardines held that an international
standard should be regarded as ineffective and inappropriate for
application when it does not accomplish the legitimate objective
pursued ("ineffective") and is not specifically suitable for the
fulfilment of those legitimate objectives ("inappropriate").6 Under
the TBT Committee Decision, the principles of effectiveness and
relevance provide positive and negative obligations for SSOs. 2 57
Positive obligations imply that standards should respond to
regulatory and market needs, be paced to scientific and
technological development, and, ideally, be performance based; the
latter is echoed in the Code of Good Practice.2 58 As to negative
obligations, standards should not distort the global market, affect
fair competition, impede innovation and technological
development, or give preference to certain countries' technical
requirements.25 9  The fact that these two principles are merged
together again opens avenues for assumptions. For instance, the
wording of the TBT Committee Decision may suggest that
ineffective standards should be also considered per se irrelevant, or
that all relevant standards are effective.2 o
To ensure that standards maintain their relevance, the OMB
Circular requires agencies to utilize the retrospective periodic
254 In other words, "the Web is, and should be, driven by technical merit, not
consensus." Jeffrey Way, A Brief History of HTML5 (Dec. 6, 2011)
https://code.tutsplus.com/articles/a-brief-history-of-html5--net-
2 3 06 4
[https://perma.cc/Y4CN-797G] (quoting Ian Hickson).
255 Simcoe,supra note 33, at 331.
256 EC-Sardines, supra note 124,5 259-62.
257 TBT Conmittee Decision, supra note 133, annex 4, 5 D(10) ("should not" vs.
"should").
258 Id. annex 4, ¶ D(11); TBT Agreement, supra note 42, annex 3().
259 TBT Committee Decision, supra note 133, annex 4, 5 D(10); TBT Agreement,
supra note 42, annex 3(D), (E).
260 TBT Committee Decision, supra note 133, annex 4, D(11)("... international
standards need to be relevant and to effectively respond to regulatory and market
needs . . . ") (emphasis added).
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review mechanism21 and urges them to collaborate with SSOs in
order to consider updates and alternatives to existing standards.26 2
Regulation 1025/2012 in turn provides with regard to ICT
standards, that those should be of sufficient quality to enable
innovation and address market needs.2 6 3
The striking absence of any further elaboration on efficiency
and relevance by US and EU frameworks may be explained by a
simple fact that standards which do not respond to the needs of the
market and the society are most likely not to be used by the industry
or to be endorsed by governmental agencies as policy tools. 264 In
fact, deviation from ineffective and irrelevant standards is not
prohibited, although it may occur at some costs. Manufacturers that
choose not to comply with an EU harmonized standard may use any
other means to demonstrate conformity of their products with the
essential requirements of the Directives, yet in practice, adherence
to European standards appears a preferred option among economic
operators.265 Refusal by a US federal agency to use a particular
private voluntary standard must be based on a valid reason, such as
a standard's inconsistency with applicable laws.2 6 6 The explanation
of why an agency decided to deviate from a standard should be
submitted in a written statement to the OMB.267 Likewise, Article
2.4 of the TBT Agreement permits Members to depart from
international standards when those are "ineffective or
inappropriate" for the fulfillment of the legitimate objectives
pursued by Members' technical regulation:26 8 a lion's share of trade
concerns raised in the TBT Committee deals exactly with Members'
technical regulations deviating from international standards, for
instance for the reason of security.
261 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011); Exec. Order No.
13,610, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,469 (May 2, 2010) (defining mechanisms).
262 REVISED OMB CIRCULAR A-119, supra note 149, § 8.
263 Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 42, annex II (4)(f).
264 The opposite would be at odds with the very nature of private standardization.
265 VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 50, at 42; Schepel, New Approach, supra note 173, at
528.
266 REVISED OMB CIRCULAR A-119, supra note 149, § 5.
267 Id. at 33-34.
268 TBT Agreement, supra note 42, § 2.4.
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e. Coherence and Coordination
Another principle that facilitates development of effective
standards is coherence. Coherence ensures optimal allocation of
SSOs' resources, avoids duplications in SSOs' activities, and
prevents possible contradiction among standards. To eliminate the
existence of conflicting international standards, the TBT Committee
Decision emphasizes the importance of coordination and
cooperation between relevant international bodies269 Ina similar
vein, SSOs within the territory of one Member shall strive to
achieve a "national consensus" on standards they produce.2 7 0 ANSI
calls upon SSOs to resolve potential conflicts within ANSs (and
thus not within SSOs' areas and scope of work) by the means of
coordination and, where possible, harmonization (again, in a
context of an "effort"),27 1 and notes that conflict situations should
be resolved in "good faith."27 2
In the EU, coherent standardization enables EU-wide
harmonization of technical requirements and supports the
functioning of the Internal Market.2 73 In this regard, coherence in
European standardization system is ensured by the so-called "stand
still" obligation, which prohibits NSOs to adopt or maintain national
standards that contradict their European equivalents.2 74 In view of
standards relevance to the market, Regulation 1025/2012 also
supports regular information exchange between NSOs, ESOs, and
the Commission as tools to ensure coherence of standards across EU
members.275
Coherence is challenging to achieve in SSOs that do not provide
for sufficient transparency. In research and development intensive
SSOs, coherence is almost an oxymoron: most widely accepted ICT
269 TBT Comnmittee Decision, supra note 133, annex 4, T D. Although it might be
suggested that the principle of coherence does not refer to standard and standard-setting
processes within a single international standards body (ISB), see Delimatsis, Global
Standard-Setting, supra note 134, at 317, it nevertheless guides the policies and
communication of that ISB and might affect its decisions in relationship with other
organizations.
270 TBT Agreement, supra note 42, annex 3(H).
271 ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS, supra note 155, § §1.4, 2.4.
272 Id. § §1.4, 2.4.2.
273 Cf. Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 42, § §1.5, 1.14.
274 Id. §§ 3.5,3.6.
275 Cf. id. §1.16.
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standards were subject to fierce competition from other
standardization initiatives in the early stages of their development
and were selected by the market due to their technical features,
costs, or compatibility with other technologies. For instance, 4G
Long Term Evolution ("LTE") standards developed in the 3rd
Generation Partnership Project ("3GPP") was almost overthrown by
IEEE-driven Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave
Access ("WiMAX") 27 6 and the USB technology standardized by the
USB Implementers forum won the battle against Firewire, also
known as IEEE 1394 High Performance Serial Bus. 7 At the same
time, many SSOs and consortia have concluded agreements or
maintained liaisons necessary for the minimum coordination among
them.27 8 Outside traditional cooperation mechanisms, effective
allocation of SSOs' work is safeguarded by the fact that many
companies who hold membership of multiple SSOs would send a
fixed group of employees to technical meetings.2 7 9
f. Appeal/Review
The principles of appeal and review constitute an important part
of modem administrative systems and are widely acknowledged in
scholarship on transnational regulation and global law.280 yet,
while the right of an individual affected by a decision to have it
reviewed by an independent ribunal is essential in domestic
administrative law, this is not always the case for transnational egal
order, where organizations typically maintain their own
adjudication or review mechanisms.2 8' The reason lies in the fact
that adjudicatory review of an institution's decision may disrupt
276 Daniel F. Spulber, Innovation Economics: The Interplay Anong Technology
Standards, Competitive Conduct and Economic Performance,9 J. INT'LEcON. L.777,793
(2014).
277 BARON ET AL., MAKING THE RULES, supra note 113, at 69.
278 To illustrate, see the list of IEEE liaisons, IEEE Liaisons, INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS.
ENG'RS STANDARDS Ass'N, https://ieee-sa.imeetcentral.com/ieeeliaisons/
[https://perma.cc/QWY4-255Q] and the list of liaison officers for ETSI, Liaison Officers,
EUR. TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST.,
https://portal.etsi.org/TBSiteMap/ee/LiaisonOfficers.aspx [https://perma.cc/98L7-
WQJG].
279 As suggested by a number of industry experts, this is a common business model
in many companies.
280 Cf. Errol Meidinger, Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The
Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L.47,79 (2006).
281 Kingsbury, supra note 12, at 39.
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interactions among its members and impede its proper societal
functioning, since such independent review often lacks knowledge
of the specific transaction.2 82 For SSOs, a distinction should be
drawn between the review of a standards content ("substantive
review") and of the processes followed for a standards'
development and approval ("procedural review").283
The principle of appeal/review is observable in all applicable
standardization instruments of the US, although the same principle
is not present in the EU or the WTO frameworks. The OMB
Circular provides that SSOs should incorporate processes for
handling procedural appeals;284 ANSI elaborates that such processes
should offer "identifiable, realistic, and readily available appeals
mechanism for the impartial handling of procedural appeals
regarding any action or inaction," 28 5 and that consideration of
appeals shall be fair, unbiased and fully address the concerns
expressed;28 6 SDOAA 2004 stipulates that SSOs should ensure that
appeals can be filed by those parties who oppose SSOs' decisions.2 87
Under Regulation 1025/2012, technical review is only
mentioned in the context of ICT specifications, which leaves the
door ajar for SSOs to decide whether they should provide appeal
and review procedures for the decision-making processes leading to
the adoption of a standard. While such procedures are indeed
implemented by the three ESOs,2 89 the fact that ANSI obliges all
SSOs to comply with its Essential Requirement for accreditation
282 Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & EcON. 233, 256 (1979) (quoting Justice Rehnquist on
collective bargaining agreements).
283 Such distinction is maintained for example within the system of the IEEE. See
INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG'RS STANDARDS Ass'N, EE-SA STANDARDS BOARD
BYLAWS § 5.2 (Mar. 2019),
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GAB-
PGVQ [hereinafter Standards Board Bylaws].
284 REVISED OMB CIRCULAR A-119, supra note 149, § (2)(e)(iv).
285 ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS, supra note 155, § 1.8.
286 Id. § 2.8.
287 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 (2004), Pub. L.
No. 108-237, § 102(5)(F), 188 Stat. 661 (2002).
288 Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 42, annex (II)(4)(a).
289 E.g., EUR. TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., ETSI DRECIvEs: STATUTES OF THE
EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS INSTITUTE § 13.4, 14.3 (Version 40,
2019), https://portal.etsi.org/directives/40_directives-apr_-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/98SS-CQDF].
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purposes encourages all US-based SSOs to introduce appeal and
review processes into their operational framework.2 9 0
g. Access to Standards on Fair, Reasonable and
Non-Discriminatory Terms
The availability of standards documents is discussed under the
principle of transparency; nevertheless, some standardization
frameworks explicitly address access to proprietary elements
incorporated into a standard or technical specification. More often
than not, the applicable instruments require SSOs to implement a
patent policy that is based on (fair), reasonable, and non-
discriminatory (F/RAND) licensing commitments.291 The
Horizontal Guidelines offer a perfect illustration, suggesting that
SSOs patent policy should require a commitment from patent-
holders to disclose their essential intellectual property and license
their technology on FRAND terms.292 The OMB Circular clarifies
that RAND licensing obligations293 extend to "implementers of the
standard" and not to "all interested parties," unlike it was stipulated
in its earlier versions.29 4 Regulation 1025/2012 explains that the
FRAND principle should also cover the royalty-free licensing
requirement.295
Inclusion and licensing of proprietary technologies into
standards is not addressed by the TBT Agreement, although
concerns related to intellectual property sometimes arise at TBT
Committee meetings.29 6 The most famous example is the discussion
on WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure ("WAPI"),
290 As such, ANSI requirements do not differentiate between SSOs producing
different types of specifications, unlike Regulation 1025/2012, which seems to maintain
particular procedural requirements for SSOs producing ICT specifications to be identified
by the Commission for EU procurement purposes. Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 42,
annex II.
291 See Contreras, An Empirical Study, supra note 76, at 3.
292 Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 185, 5 285.
293 Which the Circular explains as "a term of art in the rulemaking context." REVISED
OMB CIRCULAR A-119, supra note 149, § 9.
294 Id.
295 Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 42, annex (I)(4)(c).
296 See Comm. on Tech. Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the Meeting of 18-19 March
2015, § 2.2.2.2, WTO Doc. G/TBT/M/65 (May 28, 2015) (on intellectual property
implemented in China's guidelines for secure IT risk control mechanism in banking
sector).
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China's homegrown Wi-Fi standard running on a different security
protocol than the standard crafted in 802.11 working group of the
IEEE.297 WAPI was developed in a closed procedure, as per
applicable Chinese legislation, but embedded a number of
proprietary encryption algorithms owned by Chinese companies.2 98
Upon its approval in May 2003,299 all WLAN devices marketed in
China were obliged to comply with WAPI standard, which resulted
in a practical nightmare for all foreign equipment vendors: in order
to maintain their presence at both global and Chinese markets,
wireless devices had to be equipped with technologies reading two
sets of WLAN specifications.30 0 On top of that, Western companies
struggled to get access to essential technologies owned by Chinese
firms which lacked any licensing obligations and enjoyed the full
freedom of setting royalty rates.3 01
Fortunately for Western and Japanese exporters, the mandatory
nature of WAPI was abandoned by Chinese government, in part
following concerns expressed during the TBT meetings,3 0 2 but also
due to ISO's refusal to recognize WAPI as an international
standard.303
297 See Christopher S. Gibson, Globalization and Technology Standards Game:
Balancing Concerns of Protectionism and Intellectual Property in International
Standards, 22 BERKLEY TECH. L. J. 1403, 1435 (2007) [hereinafter Gibson] (on the WAPI
case).
298 Id. at 1424; Comm. on Tech. Barriers to Trade, Transitional Review Mechanism
in Connection with Paragraph 18 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People's
Republic of China: Questions and Commentsfrom Japan to China, 55 25-27, WTO Doc.
GITBT/W/270 (Oct. 10, 2006).
299 Eventually, the transition period was extended and the deadline for mandatory
compliance became June 2004.
300 Gibson, supra note 297, at 1437.
301 Han-Wei Liu, International Standards in Flux: a BalkanizedICTStandard-Setting
Paradigm and its Implications for the WTO, 13 J.INT'LECON.L.551,595 (2014).
302 These concerns also related to the fact that China was deviating from the existing
international standards on wireless local area network equipment, the ISO IEC 8802-11,
and thus breaching its obligation under Article 2.4 TBT Agreement. Comm. on Tech.
Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the Meeting of 7-9 June 2006, 15 64-66, WTO Doc.
G/TBT/M/39 (July 31, 2006). See also Comm. on Tech. Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the
Meeting of 9 November 2006, T 97, WTO Doc. G/TBT/M/40 (Jan. 26, 2007).
303 Gibson, supra note 297, at 1462.
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h. Concerns Developing Countries or "Weaker
Parties"
The fact that effective participation of developing countries is
encapsulated in a separate principle in the TBT Committee
Decision, and not dealt with under the principle of openness akin to
US and EU frameworks addressing the involvement of weaker
parties, is no accident, given the mandate of the WTO. Under the
TBT Committee Decision, this principle consists of both passive
and active elements: it prohibits de facto exclusion of developing
countries,30 4 and calls upon providing technical assistance for
improving their participation-which is echoed in the relevant
provisions of the TBT Agreement.3 0
Even when set forth by a specific provision, the increased
involvement of developing countries may have similar flaws as
broad participation in general: anecdotal evidence suggests that
Western companies often admit fearing the "race to the bottom" and
decrease in quality of international standards as a consequence of
active involvement of developing countries in SSOs' decision-
making.3 0 6 On a positive side of the ledger, participation in global
standardization fora provides developing industry with a steep
learning curve and in the long run, may eventually facilitate
expansion of multilateral trade.
2. Observations on Procedural Safeguards
The procedural principles for standardization analyzed in this
section may set different thresholds for SSOs to demonstrate
compliance with particular legal requirements, but to some extent,
these principles are also intertwined. Transparency underpins
openness, since effective participation is impossible without access
to the relevant information. Transparency also underpins
coherence, allowing SSOs to coordinate their work programs and
ensuring efficient allocation of standards development projects.
Consensus and balanced procedures allow for the resolution of
objections and facilitate consent within the industry, thus ensuring
that standards are relevant, effective, and widely accepted.
304 It is suggested that this requirement is defined in a negative manner. Delimatsis,
Global Standard-Setting, supra note 134, at 318.
305 TBT Agreement, supra note 42, § 12.
306 This was mentioned by a number of industry experts.
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Moreover, by employing vague terms such as "relevant
stakeholders,"307 only defined in Horizontal Guidelines as "all
competitors in the market or markets affected by the standard,"3 08
and, even more ambiguous, "good/reasonable time," the procedural
frameworks provide SSOs with room for maneuver to adjust their
governance to specialized technical activities in their operational
field.
The resemblance between the frameworks may in part be
explained by the observation that the procedural principles for
international standardization offered by the WTO framework
largely stem from western administrative requirements.3 0 9 To
compare, scholarship on transnational and global administrative law
often discusses due process in the context of legitimization non-
State rule-making:310 procedural requirements then constitute
normative elements that address arising legitimacy and
accountability concerns of expertise-based governance"' and make
regulation more accessible,312 ensuring that parties' positions in
regulatory bargaining remain balanced.3 13
Given the abovementioned, the author suggests that applicable
procedural principles should be viewed holistically and in the
context of the industry field and regulatory environment in which
an SSO operates. Procedural principles for standards development
thus merely introduce "best practices" strategies for SSOs to escape
antitrust liability, develop standards to be referenced in national
regulations, or to benefit from increased legitimacy; at the same
time, they may serve as effective tools to ensure that all relevant
interests for a particular standardization activity are taken on
board.314
Yet, some elements related to the current discussions on
307 It has been suggested that what should be understood under "stakeholders" can be
business or professional associations, consumers, States, and NGOs. VAN LEEUWEN,
supra note 50, at 19.
308 Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 185,1281.
309 After all, the TBT provisions were drafted predominantly by the Western powers.
310 See Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, Between Law and Social Norms: The
Evolution of Global Governance, 22 INT'L J. JURIS. & PHIL. L. 260 (2009).
311 Harlow, supra note 17, at 201; Cassese, supra note 20, at 688.
312 Harlow, supra note 17, at 192; Cassese, supra note 20, at 685.
313 Benvenisti, supra note 246, at 325-26.
314 Note also that many legal instruments that offer these principles are actually not
binding, such as ANSI requirement, TBT Committee Decision, or Horizontal Guidelines.
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standardization are strikingly missing from the analyzed legal
frameworks. First and foremost is the lack of consideration
regarding the copyright of private standards. While some clarity
could have been offered by the principle of transparency and the
requirement of "reasonable availability" of standards, implemented
in the WTO and US frameworks, the threshold for reasonable
availability remains opaque. ISO/IEC Guide 2 provides that
standards' public availability is "presumed to constitute
acknowledged rules of technology"3 1 5 which may suggest that
standards that are not publicly available should not, in principle, be
endorsed as industry rules. This does not seem to be the case in the
US standardization system, which allows incorporation of standards
that are not placed into the public domain. OMB Circular explicitly
refused to provide any concrete definition of the "reasonably
available" requirement, referring to the OFR, but provided some
guidance by mentioning which aspects should be viewed as
facilitating such availability, including access to standards'
summary and read-only versions.16
The debate on SSO's governance is also absent: the frameworks
do not clarify whether the principles apply to all activities of SSOs,
or only to technical development of standards. Yet, if the latter is
the case, as ANSI suggests,317 SSOs may argue to have wider
discretion when designing their governance rules rather than when
developing their standards. In theory, a standard can then be drafted
following procedures that were developed in opaque and closed
processes that did not represent industry consensus.
Ultimately, the question remains whether the procedural
principles as currently formulated are adequate to ensure the
balance of interests in ICT standardization, given their broad
interpretation and the regulatory framework from which they
derive.
315 ISO/IEC Guide 2, supra note 49, art. 3.2.1.
316 REVISED OMB CIRCULAR A-119, supra note 149, § 5(f).
317 ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS, supra note 155, § 1.0 ("These requirements
apply to activities related to the development of consensus for approval, revision,
reaffirmation, and withdrawal of American National Standards.") (emphasis added).
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V. Challenges in Regulating and Enforcing Due Process in the
Current Landscape of ICT Standardization
Despite significant regulatory autonomy of SSOs, their
processes may still be curbed by various legal instruments available
under multiple jurisdictions. Yet, to assess their practical value,
these procedural instruments should be reviewed in the wider scope
of the legal frameworks from which they are derived. To that end,
section V of this paper evaluates the extent to which each of the
studied frameworks apply to the various types of SSOs and whether
procedural scrutiny of SSOs' processes against the principles is
attainable under the current standardization landscape.
A. Applicability of Legal Frameworks to Various SSOs
Section IV observed that the WTO, US, and EU regulatory
frameworks adopt a similar approach when addressing private SSOs
by formulating due process requirements as "best practices" to be
further implemented by SSOs in their own process. This section
will bring this analysis a step further, and discuss whether different
types of private SSOs, ranging from organizations recognized in
national legislation to informal platforms for stakeholder
cooperation, fall within the scope of the three regulatory
frameworks, which will ultimately facilitate assessing the relevance
of these frameworks, and their principles, for ICT standardization.
1. WTO Law
The six principles of the TBT Committee Decision apply to
international standards developed by recognized bodies; this
implies that cover standardization activities of the ISO and the IEC,
which TBT implicitly recognizes by referring to the definitions of
the ISO/IEC Guide in its Annex 1.8" By the same token, TBT
Agreement covers standards produced by the international bodies
listed in Annex A of the SPS Agreement, namely Codex
Alimentarius Commission, International Office of Epizootics and
International Plant Protection Convention.1 Following the
318 TBT Agreement, supra note 42, annex 1.
319 Note that unlike the SPS Agreement, TBT does provide an indicative list of
standards bodies covered by the Agreement. Comm. on Sanitary & Phytosanitary
Measures,Note by the Secretariat: Effects ofSPS-related Private Standards - Compilation
ofReplies, annex A(3), WTO Doc. G/SPS/GEN/932/Rev. 1 (Dec. 9,2009). Following the
reasoning of the Panel in US-Tuna I, the fact that those bodies were listed by the SPS
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reasoning of the Appellate Body in US-Tuna II, the fact that those
bodies were listed by the SPS Committee which consists of whole
WTO membership serves as proof as they have "recognized
activities in standardization."320 Furthermore, TBT Decision
provisions are expected to cover standards set by the International
Telecommunication Union ("ITU"), as this specialized agency of
the UN is also likely to enjoy a status of a recognized international
standards body. 3 2 ' In turn, the Code of Good Practice, while in
theory covering a very broad range of SSOs, would only apply
inasmuch as the SSOs explicitly accept it which, in the absence of
any TBT obligation towards these SSOs, can only be ensured by the
Member where the SSO is established.3 2 2
It appears that, despite their evident role in multilateral trade,
most of the ICT standards, being industry-driven initiatives outside
the recognized international standards bodies, still manage to escape
the purview of WTO law and are not covered by the TBT
Agreement. It has even been suggested that an implicit
governmental endorsement of a private standards body could allow
that government to escape its WTO obligations, unless the measure
Committee which consists of whole WTO membership serves as proof that they have
"recognized activities in standardization." Panel Report, United States - Measures
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 360-63,
WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R, (adopted Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter US-Tuna II Panel
Report].
320 US-Tuna II Panel Report, supra note 319, at 360-63.
321 Although ITU accommodates both governmental members and private parties, the
former clearly prevail in their decision-making power, since contributions of private actors
are limited to the Sector of their affiliation. Collection of the Basic Texts Adopted by the
Plenipotentiary Conference, INT'L TELECOMMS. UNION [ITU], art. 3 (2015),
http://search.itu.int/history/HistoryDigitalCollectionDocLibrary/5.21.61.en.100.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X3BN-4R2F].
322 Partiti, supra note 142. It should be noted that there is another related mechanism
for recommended practices for standardization, namely the ISO/IEC Guide 59 - ISO and
IEC Recommended Practices for Standardization by National Bodies (2d ed., 2019). The
first edition of the Guide was adopted in 1994, thus before the TBT Code of Good Practice.
In 2019, the Guide was updated with recommendations for implementation of the TBT
Committee Decision and the Code of Good Practice. Among other things, the new version
of the Guide refers to FRAND terms (Art. 4.5.8), provides recommendations for SSOs'
leadership on dealing with sustained objections (Art. 4.4.4), introduces requirements of
complaints and appeals resolution processes (Art. 4.4.7), and highlights that SSOs'
governance bodies and staff should act independently from those financing their activities
(Art. 4.4.6); at the same time, the new version of the Guide is limited in its scope to only
national bodies (Art. 1) and thus does not cover the majority of SSOs developing ICT
standards.
at issue could indeed be attributed to the government.323 Yet, private
SSOs fulfill an essential function at world trade arena. In the
agricultural sector, for example, private actors are key players in the
development and application of standards for food safety.3 24
Moreover, compliance with private standards, even when those are
not adopted as technical regulations, is often a prerequisite for
accessing a large number of developed countries' markets and
creates confusion for exporters who already have to comply with
requirements set by formal standard-setters.32 5  From a purely
procedural perspective, scrutiny of private standards under the
principles of TBT Committee Decision is desirable to ensure that
these standards are developed in a transparent and open manner and
that procedural guarantees are afforded at all stages of standards
development.326
Although WTO Members regularly express concerns regarding
the absence of a coherent WTO framework for private standards,3 2 7
323 Jan Wouters & Dylan Geraets, Private Food Standards and the World Trade
Organization: Some Legal Considerations, 11 WORLD TRADE REv.479,485 (2012).
324 See FOOD & AGRc. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS& WORLD TRADE ORG., TRADE
AND FOOD STANDARDS 27 (2017)
https://www.wto.org/english/res-elbooksp-e/tradefoodfaol7_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WCQ6-66WE].
325 See Comm. on Sanitary & Phytosanitary Measures, Note by the Secretariat:
Effects of SPS-related Private Standards - Compilation of Replies, WTO Doc.
G/SPS/GEN/932/Rev. 1 (Dec. 9, 2009).
326 Mavroidis & Wolfe, supra note 53, at 21 (on the perils of poor standards
development processes). Arguably, standards' endorsement through the WTO
mechanisms also strengthens their enforcement, since such tasks as standards'
implementation, monitoring and enforcement then become the matter of States, relevant
WTO Committees and Dispute Settlement Bodies. See Filippo Fontanelli, ISO and Codex
Standards and International Trade Law: What Gets Said is Not What's Heard, 60 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 895, 896 (2011).
327 Comm. on Tech. Barriers to Trade, Fifth Triennial Review of the Operation and
Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade under Article 15.4,126,
WTO Doc. G/TBT/26 (Nov. 13, 2009). A few years ago, China suggested further
discussion on private standards in TBT Committee; however, China's proposal to draft a
TBT guide on the use of private voluntary standards was actively opposed by the US and
the EU. See Comm. on Tech. Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the Meeting of 15-16 June
2016, 5 3.2.4.3.2, WTO Doc. G/TBT/M/69 (2016). Previously, Members have also
expressed concerns under the SPS Agreement: in particular, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines were concerned that the operation of a EurepGAP scheme in relation to trade
in bananas with supermarkets in the United Kingdom was not covered by WTO provisions.
See Comm. on Sanitary & Phytosanitary Measures, Private Standards and the SPS
Agreement, WTO Doc. G/SPS/GEN/746 (Jan. 24, 2007).
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even meagre attempts to outline the basic concepts for private
standardization have not been met with a great enthusiasm by the
wider WTO community.3 28 Currently, the discussion on private
standards and their coverage by WTO law in general, and the TBT
Agreement in particular, seems to have reached an impasse. On one
hand, since the TBT obligations were designed for the Members,329
extending the scope of the TBT Agreement and its principles to
private SSOs would inevitably lead to increased governmental
involvement in many fields that have traditionally been a matter of
the private sector. This may upset the intergovernmental structure
of the WTO system and provoke widespread discontent among
industry. On the other hand, allowing private standards to avoid
WTO scrutiny prompts far thornier questions related to the
inclusiveness and openness of the multilateral trading system,
where exporters can bear extra costs of the de facto rules they did
not adopt or agree to.33 0
In this regard, due attention should be paid to standards for
technological interoperability and their exposure to the rules of
international trade. As such, the WTO does not provide for a
specific mechanism for addressing technology standardization
either in formal SSOs (other than the ISO/JEC/ITU and alike) or in
consortia.3 31 To fall within the scope of WTO law, a measure should
either be a mandatory requirement ("technical regulation")3 3 2 or a
standard adopted by a "recognized" body"333- both are rarely the
case for wireless telecommunications or Internet specifications,
typically developed by industry-driven platforms.
Moreover, members seem reluctant to discuss issues related to
interoperability standards in the TBT Committee. For instance,
when the United States expressed concerns regarding Korea's draft
regulation to mandate the standard on Wireless Internet Platform for
Interoperability ("WIPI"), Korea believed that this issue should be
328 Attempts in SPS were not crowned with success, since Members failed to agree
even on the definition of a "private standard." Mavroidis & Wolfe, supra note 53, at 12.
329 TBT Agreement, supra note 42, art. 1.
330 See generally Mavroidis & Wolfe, supra note 53; Thorstensen et al., supra note
141.
331 Rather, the TBT Agreement addresses standards in general (unlike Regulation
1025/2012, which does provide for a mechanism for ICT standardization).
332 TBT Agreement, supra note 42, annex 1(1).
333 Id. annex 1(2).
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raised under the General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS") 3 3 4 and not the TBT Agreement, since WIPI was "a
technical interface standard that governed interconnection among
networks of wireless Internet service providers," adding that the
notification of the measure under the TBT Agreement was
submitted merely for transparency purposes."' But while the GATS
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS"),336 which covers issues related to
patents, may indeed apply to telecommunications and wireless
network standards, they lack the procedural framework for
standards development offered by TBT Committee Decision, and
hence are ineffective for procedural scrutiny of (private) SSOs.
There are, however, mechanisms to bring private SSOs under
the scope of WTO law. Firstly, submitting a private sector activity
to the scrutiny under a WTO Agreement is thus not an unchartered
area under the WTO acquis: a vivid example is the WTO
Antidumping Agreement, which allows States to apply measures to
foreign firms.3 37 Secondly, the TBT Agreement provides for the
mechanisms to scrutinize standards development procedures of
private SSOs against the Code of Good Practice, as long as
Members where such SSOs are incorporated are willing to enforce
the Code's provisions. Thirdly, arrangements that monitor
compliance with the rules of international trade can be negotiated
outside the WTO framework: suggestions to launch an international
forum on private standards that will represent the interests of
stakeholders and ensure better cooperation between SSOs,
governments and stakeholders have previously been made by the
United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards ("UNFSS").3 38
These arrangements, however, should be sufficiently flexible to
334 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex iB, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183.
335 Comm. on Tech. Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the Meeting Held on 20 March
2003,55 54-55, WTO Doc. G/TBT/M/29 (May 19,2003).
336 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299.
337 Mavroidis & Wolfe, supra note 53, at 10.
338 See DADUSH ET AL., WORLD EcONOMIC FORUM, WHAT COMPANIES WANT FROM
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 14-15 (2015),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFGACTradeH_2015.pdf[https://perma.cc/WJX8-
Y44S] (on suggestions of UNFSS).
[Vol. XLV608 N.C. J. INT'L L.
GOVERNANCE OF ICT STANDARDIZATION
preserve the advantages of industry standardization.
It may also be suggested that standards created by industry
consortia may be submitted to the TBT procedural principles once
they are endorsed by a recognized SSO. Arguably, compliance with
the WTO framework for standardization is expected from US-based
SSOs that are accredited by ANSI. These, in turn, may be both
formal and informal bodies dealing with interoperability of
telecommunications networks, standards consumer electronic
equipment and design of software.3 3 9
2. US and EU Law
The role of the US governmental agencies and the European
Commission in private standardization activities cannot be
compared to the one of the WTO Secretariat. As such, the WTO
does not partake in the meetings of technical experts (what US
agencies are encouraged to do) or enjoy a Counsellor or observer
status in private SSOs, nor can it propose standardization projects
(which is the Commission's prerogative in the ESOs). Hence,
already by participating in private standardization activity,
regulators can be the watchdog of due process in SSOs, albeit they
contribute to standards development on an equal footing with other
stakeholders.340
Since the US regulatory framework does not provide for the
establishment of specific bodies that develop standards for
references in national laws and policies,3 4 1 it is assumed to cover a
wider range of SSOs. As is the case with the WTO framework,
industry consortia will only fall under the procedural principles of
OMB Circular and ANSI once the ANSI accredits them.3 42  The
procedural principles of Regulation 1025/2012 largely apply to the
development of harmonized standards by the ESOs and NSOs and
to a lesser extent, to informal ICT platforms, whose standards can
339 Examples are the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS),
Consumer Electronics Association (CEA), Dimensional Metrology Standards Consortium
(DMSC), OSEHRA and MedBiquitous. See Accredited Standards Developers, AM.NAT'L
STANDARDS INST. (Nov. 2019), https://share.ansi.org/ [https://perma.cc/69ES-HA5X].
340 This was confirmed in a number of conversations with standardization experts;
moreover, the opposite does not appear from the legal documents.
341 But cf. Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 42, annex I.
342 ANSI does not appear to distinguish between consortia or formal SSOs for its
accreditation purposes.
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be used for the EU procurement purposes.
3. US and EU Antitrust Law
In the US and EU, antitrust provisions governing
standardization are not confined to international standards or
technical regulations, and hence also apply to industry consortia and
informal standard-setting groups. For this reason, SDOAA and the
Horizontal Guidelines may be assumed to cover a broader range of
standards and standardization platforms than the TBT Agreement or
the applicable US and EU legislation, especially considering that
the competition and antitrust provisions can be subject to
extraterritorial application and curb anti-competitive conduct
outside their jurisdictions.3  It should be noted, however, that both
SDOAA and Horizontal Guidelines limit the liability of SSOs, but
not of their Members. Accordingly, individual parties participating
in standards development may still be prosecuted for
anticompetitive conduct that occurred in standards development.
It should be noted that the EC Horizontal Guidelines only apply
to those SSOs that can be classified as "undertakings" under EU
law.34 5 In Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf(SCK),346 the
CJEU found a Dutch certification institution which obliged the use
of cranes and prohibited certified firms to sub-contract their
activities to a non-certified firm, restraining parallel trade and
creating barrier for market access, to be an undertaking.34 7 In its
reasoning, the Court relied on the fact that SCK carried out an
economic activity akin to a private undertaking and, since
certification was provided upon the payment, was also seeking
343 See Regulation 1025/2012, supra note 42, annex 11.
344 This appears from the established case law in the EU. See Joined Cases 89/85,
104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 & 125/85 to 129/85, Ahstr6m and Others v. Commission,
1988 E.C.R. 5193; and in the U.S., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945). Moreover, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 applies to a conduct
involving trade or commerce with foreign nations, when that conduct has a direct,
substantial and foreseeable effect on trade or commerce in the U.S., or when foreign
conduct was meant to produce and indeed produced substantial effects in the US territory.
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
345 Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 185, art. 1.1.6.
346 Joined Cases T-213/95 & T-18/96, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf
(SCK), Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanverhuurbedrijven (FNK) v. Comm'n, 1997
E.C.R. 11-1739.
347 Id. at 121-22.
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profits.3 48  Yet in SELEX,34 9 the CJEU held that Eurocontrol, an
international standard-setting body in the field of air traffic
management, was not involved in an economic activity when
developing its technical standards and hence, fell outside the scope
of competition law."' Later, the CJEU found that the Ordem dos
Ticnicos Oficiais de Contas v. Autoridade da Concorrencia
(OTOC), a Portugal-based association for Charter Accountants that
established the system of compulsory trainings,3 5 1 laid down
discriminatory conditions to the detriment of its competitors and
hence reflected an exclusionary agreement among the members of
the organizations in breach of Article 101 TFEU.3 5 2
How does this analysis of procedural frameworks fit into the
bigger picture of regulating industry activity? Following the
reasoning suggested in this section, SSOs that are not covered by
the TBT Agreement will fall within the scope of US and EU
regulation or-if those do not apply as well-within the US and EU
competition law frameworks, provided that their standards restrict
trade or market access in the US or the EU, which should not be
difficult to prove considering standards subject to the discussions in
this paper are widely applicable.
B. Relevance of the Procedural Principles to ICT
Standardization
Procedural scrutiny of SSOs' standards development processes
against the principles set forth by the applicable legal frameworks
is beneficial from the perspective of many actors, in particular,
stakeholders that are not widely represented in SSOs' technical
committees, such as civil society and policy-makers. If private
SSOs are covered by the TBT Agreement, their standards can be
348 Id. at 117.
349 Case T-155/04, SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA v. Comm'n of the Eur.
Communities, 2006 E.C.R. -04797.
350 Id., J 4. Earlier, the General Court said that Eurocontrol could not be considered
a service provider since adoption of its standards is a legislative activity. SELEX, 2006
E.C.R. 11-04797, at 61.
351 Case C-1/12, Ordem dos T6cnicos Oficiais de Contas v. Autoridade da
Concorrencia, 2013 ECLI:EU:C:2013:127. Ordem dos Tecnicos Oficias de Contras
(OTOC) allowed competing bodies to provide compulsory training but claimed certain
courses exclusively.
352 Id. at 97. According to the Court, OTOC held a public service mission and was
de facto acting in a relevant market for professional trainings of charted accountants.
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submitted to the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms, including
consultations between parties and adjudication by WTO Panels and
ultimately, by the Appellate Body. Opening avenues to examine
private standards under the WTO principles will contribute towards
inclusive and transparent national technical regulations. In this
regard, it can be expected that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
("DSB") will follow the path of the US and EU Courts: rather than
engaging in complex discussions on technical aspects of private
standards, Panels or the Appellate Body will examine the processes
followed during their standards development. The legal instruments
guiding this analysis will be the TBT Committee Decision and the
Code of Good Practice.
Herein lies the question, whether the WTO procedural
principles formulated in the 1990s remain appropriate for
contemporary standardization activity. Considering increased
digitalization, cross-sectoral cooperation, and convergence of
different scientific fields in which SSOs operate, the "one approach
fits all" way to scrutinize standards development procedures seems
futile and may even have adverse effects on the technical work of
an SSO. For instance, the above-mentioned lack of transparency in
ICT consortia as a result of their reluctance to reveal their work
programs is in part explained by the intensely competitive
environment in which those consortia operate. Unlike formal SSOs,
where standards are first drafted in the technical committees and
only then introduced to broader industry, consortia-developed
standards are put to the market test, and the ultimate choice of the
"winning" standard (which then becomes the "de facto" standard)
rests upon the industry. The infamous "standards war" between the
Betamax and VHS videotape formats in late 1970s and early 1980s
perfectly illustrates competition between informal standardization
activities.35
As a matter of course, increased transparency as desired by the
TBT instruments and Regulation 1025/2012 will, in all likelihood,
lessen competitiveness of a consortium. By the same token, greater
openness of informal SSOs, although generally welcomed by civil
society, is prone to reduce the decision-making speed in an informal
industry group, again impairing effectiveness and competitiveness
of its standards. That said, consortia, similarly to many formal
353 Michael A. Cusumano et al., Strategic Maneuvering and Mass-Market Dynamics:
The Triumph of VHS Over Beta, 66 Bus. HIST. REv. 1, 51, 66 (1992).
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SSOs, typically have other mechanisms at their disposal to ensure
that their standardization activities comply with a minimum of due
process requirements of transparency, openness, and participation
and that the voice of the relevant stakeholders is heard. W3C, for
instance, makes the charters of its working groups publicly
available.3 54 Bluetooth SIG provides an environment for
interoperability testing ("IOP") and implements adopters' feedback
on technical performance of Bluetooth specifications prior to their
official release.3
Amid formal SSOs, the IEEE-SA offers the drafts of its
standards for a public review process, albeit against a fee for the
"public."356 In the ISO and IEC, whose membership is open only to
the national committees of the UN Members, the interests of certain
groups of stakeholders are represented by separate organizations.
This does not mean, however, that these groups do not face any
hurdles: for example, many non-members representing interests of
civil society and consumers have to apply for a liaison status for
every ISO/JEC technical committee of its interest. In view of their
limited voting rights in working groups and committees, "weaker"
stakeholders are compelled to resort to lobbying, which in turn puts
into question the independence of SSOs' members and hence,
impartiality and fairness of SSOs' standardization activities.
Transparency and coherence within the meaning of the WTO,
US and EU procedural frameworks especially gains in prominence
once a standard has already established itself on the market, since it
prevents duplication of standardization activities and ensures
coherence among the industry. This, however, does not exempt
SSOs from ensuring that their procedure is fair and balanced uring
the earlier stages of standards development: the opposite increases
the chance to obstruct industry consensus, since those who disagree
with technical features of a standard, or with procedures followed
during its development, will most likely develop their own
normative frameworks. W3C was founded in the early 1990s, in
part as a response to time-consuming, consensus-based processes of
354 E.g., HTML Working Group Charter, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (2006),
https://www.w3.org/2007/03/HTML-WG-charter.html [https://perma.cc/YTK8-QMUUJ.
355 BLUETOOTH SIG, SPECIFICATION MANAGEMENT PROCESS DocuMENT § 4.3.1 (May
17, 2019), https://3pl46c46ctxO2p7rzdsvsg21-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/SMPD.pdf [https://perma.cc/29NH-7C52].
356 IEEE-SA, OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 112, § 5.4.5.
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IETF; 35 7 a decade later, a group of Web browser vendors separated
from W3C and founded a new group for web standards, the Web
Hypertext Application Technology Working Group
("WHATWG"), following a disagreement with the W3C on
technical and procedural merits.3 58 This illustrates that the industry
reacts despite being "locked in" by particular standards.
In this context, the WTO procedural principles fail to reflect
contemporary aspects of standardization, such as increased
importance of private and "informal" standards, inclusion of
proprietary solutions in ICT specifications and the need to find a
balance between effective and inclusive standardization processes.
In contrast, US and EU frameworks, while marginally
implementing the six principles of the TBT Committee Decision,
provide mechanisms that are more advanced and effective in
addressing private standards than those offered under the WTO
framework.
In particular, national standardization frameworks are most
useful when it comes to disclosure and licensing of SEPs: soft law
and jurisprudence on antitrust and unfair licensing practices are
well-established on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as in emerging
economies such as China and India.3 5 9 Moreover, in the US
standardization system, ANSI's accreditation grants increased
legitimacy to SSOs, inciting compliance with its procedural
requirements; in turn, procedural enforcement in EU
standardization systems is centralized and mostly occurs via the
national Courts or the CJEU.
This preference towards national frameworks does not mean
that the principles encapsulated in their legal instruments should be
taken as a proxy for regulation of standardization activities. After
all, as it was suggested in the previous sections, none of the
frameworks are sufficiently clear nor efficient to encompass
contemporary standards development. But even though both US
and EU legal frameworks remain incomplete, their institutions
357 Contreras, supra note 252 (citing Andrew L. Russell, Constructing Legitimacy:
The W3C's Patent Policy, in OPENING STANDARDS 159 (Laura DeNardis ed., 2011)).
358 The main point of the disagreement was the preference of the W3C community for
the XML standard, while members of WHATWG preferred to continue the improvement
of HTML.
359 See THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW:
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 263 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018) (on FRAND-
related disputes around the world).
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appear more suitable to ensure SSOs' compliance with the
principles of transparency, openness and consensus than the WTO.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Standardization is one of the most controversial and wide-
ranging areas of contemporary rule-making. Despite the existence
of a well-established legal framework and a significant body of
research, many aspects related to industry regulation by the means
of setting technical standards are yet to be explored. Especially
when it comes to the balance of interests in complex standards
development processes-such as the balance between accessing
standards and granting SSOs proprietary rights over their creations,
between monetizing patents and building new technologies on
existing standards, between ensuring that societal and security
interests are taken on board while innovation and technological
progress continue to flourish-many issues remain unresolved. Yet,
achievement of this balance is crucial, especially in times when
standardization becomes global and multidimensional, and when
societal concerns arise in sectors that have traditionally been driven
by technical considerations, such as the ICT.3 6 0 In this regard,
failure to address all relevant interests is likely to create a situation
where there will be multiple standards for the same functionality,
jeopardizing the global effort to develop universally applicable
standards.361
360 Recently, the US Department of Justice ("DoJ") recalled the need of SSOs to
ensure the balance of interests in order to benefit from SDOAA in its intervention in the
case NSS Labs, Inc. v. Symantec Corporation, No. 18-cv-05711, Statement of Interest of
the United States (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2019). While the Court refrained from ruling on
DoJ's arguments regarding balance, this intervention as such indicates the growing interest
of the DoJ with the balance in SSOs, for now at least for antitrust purposes. NSS Labs
Inc. v. Symantec Corporation, No. 18-cv-05711-BLF, 2019 WL 3804679, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 13, 2019).
361 To illustrate: CDMA2000 and WDCMA, the two competing standards for 3
Generation (3G) mobile technology, were driven by commercial interests of equipment
vendors to monetize their SEPs, which cause inconveniences in standards implementation
and fragmentation of the global telecom market. While some services providers used
CDMA2000, others preferred WDCMA: since the latter lacked backwards compatibility
with the CDMA standards series, manufacturers wishing to implement both standards had
to get access to a set of different technologies, resulting in additional costs. Luis Cabral
& David Salant, Evolving Technologies and Standards Regulation, 36 INT'L J.INDUS.ORG.
48, 49 (2014). At the time of writing, the future of universal 5G standard is rather
uncertain; although the preference of governments and the industry lies in a global
solution, with the current debate around Huawei, a situation where multiple regional 5G
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This paper suggests that safeguarding various interests in the
standardization process is a complex legal issue which can be
addressed, as least in part, by the procedural principles offered by
the applicable regulatory frameworks. Its further analysis reveals,
however, that in case of ICT standardization, the current regulatory
environment of the WTO, US and EU is not well-equipped to secure
the balance of interests, firstly, because the applicable regulatory
frameworks do not always apply to this particular type of
standardization activity and, secondly, because these frameworks
fall short of addressing current concerns related to standard-setting.
At the same time, since the procedural principles discussed in this
paper represent the "best effort" practices, they offer, at least in
theory, a good normative framework and can be curbed to address
the issues of copyrighted standard, patent licensing and societal
interests in technocratic decision-making. In this regard, the
takeaways of the paper should be the following:
First, even if SSOs' scrutiny against the legal framework is
undesirable in a broader context, recourse to these frameworks is
necessary in case standards development gravely breaches the law,
for instance in case of cartel-forming or human rights violations.
These issues can be successfully addressed under US and EU
frameworks, which benefit from strong enforcement institutions
and established jurisprudence on private standardization. As it
stands now, the WTO does not provide for an appropriate forum to
resolve private standardization concerns, even when these standards
are harmful for a group of WTO Members, unless SSOs developing
those standards have accepted the Code of Good Practice.
Second, in the effort to achieve standards' legitimacy, SSOs
need to work together with regulatory agencies and governmental
institutions that incorporate their standards, and the roles of
regulators and private institutions should be clearly divided. The
burden to ensure that standards development processes offer
sufficient procedural guarantees rests with SSOs, who enjoy greater
autonomy to implement "best effort" principles in the manner which
is deemed most beneficial for their particular standardization
activity given SSOs' membership composition, operational field
standards will be created does not seem unlikely, although at this time, remains merely a
speculation. Likewise, governmental measures targeted at prohibiting Huawei's
participation in US-based SSOs, if indeed adopted, will most likely preclude open and
inclusive standardization as desired by the procedural frameworks.
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and the nature of their standards. Procedural principles cannot be
applied in an identical manner to each and every standardization
activity but, being familiar with the specifics of their industry sector,
SSOs are well-positioned to scrutinize their processes against the
procedural principles. In turn, whether a standard is sufficiently
legitimate to exert binding obligations should appear f om decision-
making processes of governmental agencies that incorporate
standards into their regulatory documents. In this regard, the
relevant questions to ask are: is the agency's decision unbiased?
Did the agency consider alternatives? Were concerns of affected
stakeholders sufficiently addressed?
Such an approach suggests that "de facto" binding standards are
not subjected to the legitimacy-check by governments, since they
do not become binding by the force of law: recall that under both
US and EU frameworks, standards can metamorphize into binding
rules only by virtue of a reference in legal documents. This type of
standard undergoes a different type of legitimization: once the
industry decides that the standard is not fit for purpose, this standard
would typically be overthrown by a superior alternative. For a long
time, standardization of technologies has entrusted industry with the
selection of dominant standards: governmental intervention in this
process risks undermining incentives of private actors to compete at
"the market for standards" and may therefore disturb the quality of
SSOs' work.
Ultimately, any further discussion on balance of interests in
standardization should be carried out in a broader context, taking
into account international and national legal provisions on
standardization as well as such aspects as the modes of standards'
incorporation and SSOs' operational fields. Applying this broader
lens separately to each standard will be a challenging task for the
Courts. On a positive note, this approach is most likely to produce
accurate and sector-specific results and to reduce ambiguities
around private ownership of incorporated standards.362
In this regard, the issue of access to standards, incorporation of
societal interests in technocratic-decision making as well as in the
governance of individual SSOs form an agenda for future research
in the field of standardization. This academic work, however,
362 Such individual approach was also suggested by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in American Society for Testing v. PublicResource.Org,
Inc., 896 F.3d 437 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
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should be performed with caution, and should reflect the current
landscape of industry standardization as well as the regulatory needs
of scientific domains in which particular SSOs operate, rather than
attempting to curb the processes of each and every SSO under a
single theoretical framework.
